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Abstract 
Neutrality has always brought attention of scholars and politicians as well. Recent events in 
Ukraine and further debates on Ukraine’s alignment status have once again sparked interest to 
exploring this concept and the reasons for a state to adopt a neutral stance. The aim of this study 
is to contribute to the growing researches on neutrality in international politics by exploring 
particular explanations for different forms of neutrality. For this purpose, it conceptually 
differentiates forms of neutrality according to their degree of institutionalization, i.e. permanent 
neutrality and non-alignment, and explains the factors leading states to adopt one form or the 
other.  
Based on existing theories of alignment behavior, the thesis formulates two explanations of 
neutral status: a domestic-level explanation and an explanation emphasizing ideational factors. 
These explanations are then applied to the cases of Ukraine and Turkmenistan. Whereas the 
former has followed a policy of non-alignment, the latter has adopted a permanently neutral 
status. Accounting for these differences in neutral status, the study demonstrates the relevance of 
domestic-level and ideational factors. 
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Introduction 
This study explores the policy of neutrality in international politics. The relevance of this topic 
lies in the need for researching the concept on neutrality in general and its derivatives. The 
notion of neutrality has developed alongside of the notion of war, as the most primitive 
explanation for neutrality asserts that certain actors want to stay outside an armed conflict. 
Among the legal findings of neutrality meaning, neutrality can be understood as a right of nation 
to remain at peace with other nations. There is a gap in the academic literature of studying 
explanations for state’s adherence to particular alignment behaviour, i.e. permanently neutral or 
just non-aligned. Most of the literature on neutrality is grounded in international law, where 
scholars debate on the rights and obligations of neutral states, their behaviour in conflict 
situations. However, current world order makes the terminology even more difficult with the 
existence of post-neutral states, former neutrals, militarily non-aligned states and non-allied 
states (Gavouneli, 2012; Morris and White, 2011). In addition, most of the studies are focused on 
European examples of neutral states (Agius, 2006; Devine, 2008; Fischer, T., Aunesluoma, J., 
and Makko, A., 2016; Jesse, 2006). They tend to explore some individual features of the neutral 
cases rather than to find common trends, and only few researches pay attention to Central-Asian 
region, particularly to Turkmenistan. That is why this study will contribute to exploring the 
explanations of certain alignment behaviour of states. Within the theoretical framework, most of 
researches on neutrality are placed within realist perspective (Karsh, 1988; Walt, 1985; Walt, 
1987). This thesis argues that a realist approach to the concept of neutrality does not provide an 
adequate explanation of the phenomenon. Instead, this study advocates a shift to the domestic 
level, to domestic-level explanations of neutrality, assuming that regime-security concerns and 
the national identity image affect the adoption of permanently neutral or non-aligned status. It 
should be added that ideational explanation is based on the constructivist approach to the concept 
of neutrality. 
In addition, this study contributes to the explanation of different dimensions of the neutrality 
concept, i.e. permanent neutrality and non-alignment. Permanent neutrality obliges states to 
formally remain outside the structures of collective security both in peaceful time and wartime. 
On the contrary, non-alignment means a political position for countries in avoiding entanglement 
in conflicts, as non-aligned status does not preclude neutrality all the time. However, at the 
present stage of development of international relations, there is a tendency to consider neutrality 
in general and non-aligned status as similar or even identical in peacetime. Moreover, the 
modern interpretation of both international legal statuses in practice is reduced to
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 the fact that participation in security institutions does not contradict neutrality or non-alignment 
until it entails participation in collective actions related to the provision of collective defense. 
Comparing Turkmenistan and Ukraine and investigating the reasons for their choices of 
alignment behaviour sheds light on the factors that account for the adoption of permanent 
neutrality in contrast to mere non-alignment. The study, therefore, aims to explore the factors 
determining the degree of institutionalization of neutrality. The research question is: “What 
determines the choice of permanent neutrality in Turkmenistan and non-alignment in Ukraine?” 
It is worth mentioning that a characteristic feature of the problem of permanent neutrality and 
non-aligned status in Ukraine is their excessive politicization. However, in the context of 
military aggression, the question of permanent neutrality and non-aligned status has become one 
of the most urgent not only for Ukrainian politicians, but also for academics, since the issue of 
the neutral status is primarily a matter of national security of Ukraine (Brzezinski, 2014; 
Kissinger, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014). Currently, a non-aligned status is in principle acceptable 
phenomenon for Ukraine. On the one hand, it hinders the creation of an alternative security 
structure in the East of Europe under the auspices of the Russian Federation and does not impose 
any obstacles on the ‘bridging the bridges’ with Western security structures, such as NATO. On 
the other hand, strategic documents on the foreign and defense policies identify Ukraine within 
the integration processes into the economic (EU) and military-political (NATO) structures of 
European security. Therefore, the possible future neutral status of Ukraine can be regarded as 
conditional. 
As for Turkmenistan, the revision to its permanent neutral status has also become relevant 
recently. The limits of its positive neutrality are tested by different factors, including the export 
of natural gas and security at the border with Afghanistan (Bradley, 2015). In 2015, the 
construction of the Turkmen section of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline 
should be started. Turkish President Erdogan paid a visit at that time in order to start negotiating 
over a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, transporting Turkmen gas through the South Caucasus to 
Turkey. Two other Caspian gas producing countries, Russia and Iran opposed such project. In 
this case, the reference to the policy of neutrality is unlikely to help Ashgabat easily solve the 
issue in its favour. 
Another issue is fighting in the north of neighbouring Afghanistan. In 2014, militants crossed at 
least twice the border of Turkmenistan with clashes. In one of these clashes, three Turkmen 
border guards died. However, the Turkmenistan's military structures, which did not have any 
combat experience, did not respond even when militants temporarily seized part of the country's 
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territory - half of the island on the Amu-Darya River, which divided the border line halfway. It 
would be impossible for the Turkmen authorities to ask external help to confront this threat, due 
to the principles of positive neutrality. President Berdimuhamedov would rather reconceptualise 
and redefine his policy of permanent neutrality in order to avoid external interference in any 
security matters of Turkmenistan. 
The first section of the thesis describes the theoretical framework, focusing on the 
conceptualization of neutrality and researching theories from realist, liberal and constructivist 
schools in order to explain the choice behind different forms of neutrality. It reviews 
explanations of neutrality. Drawing on theoretical researches, it then formulates two explanations 
of different forms of neutrality: the more consolidated a regime, the higher the degree of 
institutionalization of neutrality; the second hypothesis that the more the idea of neutrality forms 
part of national identity, the higher the degree of institutionalization of neutrality. 
The second chapter defines the methodological framework of this study. It describes the research 
design of the thesis, i.e. a comparative study, and the methods and sources that will be used in 
the following analysis of different forms of neutrality.  
The third chapter contains the empirical analysis of the two cases, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, 
their non-alignment policies, and the explanations for divergent choices. It analyses the different 
forms of neutrality, shaped in the case studies, i.e. permanently neutral Turkmenistan and non-
aligned Ukraine. Therefore, it explores possible explanations of Turkmen permanent neutrality 
and Ukrainian non-alignment, focusing first on domestic level, and second on ideational 
explanations. 
Finally, in the conclusion the study summarizes the findings and concludes about the role of 
domestic-level factors, such as the regime consolidation, and ideational factors, such as the 
national identit, for different choice of the neutrality form in Turkmenistan and Ukraine, i.e. 
permanent neutrality or non-alignment. 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
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Theoretical framework of the concept of neutrality 
1.1 The concept of neutrality and non-alignment in international politics 
This section of the thesis explains the concept of neutrality, describes various forms of neutrality 
are presents a differentiation between the permanently neutral status and the non-aligned status.  
The 20th century witnessed the greatest international conflicts, so that the policy of neutrality 
was given little attention and consideration by politicians as well as political scientists, although 
neutral states existed within international system.  During the WWII some critics argued that 
they were just staying away from fighting and resisting the fascist powers and their aggression 
(Duggan, 1985). The Cold War times dictated states to seek alliances in order to maintain 
security by balancing power or balancing threats, though some neutral states maintained their 
policy (Walt, 1985). The post-cold war world views the choice of some states to remain neutral 
as unnecessary and hindering cooperation and integration of the international community (Morris 
and White, 2011). The discipline of International Relations has been neglecting the concept of 
neutrality for a long time, and this fact has left the countries that follow neutral course 
unexamined and considered to be unimportant. In addition, those few researches, appeared after 
the Cold War, were based mainly on the realist theories. 
The notion of neutrality has developed alongside of the notion of war, and not as a conceptually 
and judicially separate and independent idea. Historically, there have always been individuals or 
groups that have strived for avoiding participation in a war (Karsh, 1988, p. 13). Two major 
principles may explain the idea of neutrality: abstention and impartiality towards the belligerents, 
considering that the former initially referred to the freedom from interference with the neutral’s 
territory and trade, and the latter to the issue of equal treatment (Gavouneli, 2012). The limited 
interpretation of neutrality asserts that it is a status that prescribes certain behaviour of states 
during wartime, where the right of non-participation in wars is respected between parties 
involved in the conflict. The extended version of neutrality contains peacetime expectations as 
well (Ferreira-Perreira, 2006). Thus, today neutrality implies a peacetime status as well as 
wartime status. 
The concept of neutrality was developed in Europe mainly during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. As Oppenheim admits, the neutralisation of Switzerland and Belgium was one of the 
major events of the nineteenth century which had a huge impact on the recognition of neutrality 
within international law. The status of permanent neutrality of Switzerland was enforced by the 
great powers in 1815 within the framework of the Congress of Vienna. Switzerland was 
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guaranteed territorial integrity during wartime, therefore it had to remain neutral in all armed 
conflicts occurred on the continent. The same status was achieved by Belgium in 1839, and then 
by Luxembourg in 1867 as well. These treaties recognised neutrality as a possible national 
strategy of a state and a set of reciprocal obligations and duties, which were imposed by the 
international system in general (Karsh, 1988, p. 13-14). 
The term ‘neutrality’ originates from the Latin word ‘neuter’, meaning “neither of two”. While 
in the past there was no single and strict code of behaviour, the rules of neutrality were 
interpreted as freely as each neutral actor would like to describe in its own understanding. Such 
liberty in defining neutrality at the early stages of development led to the vagueness of the 
concept: from the non-alignment with warring parties and the continuity of impartiality to the 
hire of a neutral state’s army by one of the belligerents, or alternatively, payment to a neutral 
party in return for abstaining from participation in the conflict. States would include in their 
bilateral treaties certain conditions and clauses on the issue of neutrality in wartime in order to 
get over uncertainty in such situations. Some scholars believe that in an official document for the 
first time the concept of neutrality was adopted in 1408 with a French royal decree, where the 
King of France declared his neutrality in the struggle between the popes of Rome and Avignon 
(Karsh, 1988, p. 14).  
Another attempt to systematize the rules of neutrality was made by Hugo Grotius in his “De jure 
belli et pacts”. To begin with, he admits that there are cases when the identity of the just party is 
certain and clear, but also cases when it is hard to determine the trustworthiness of the party. 
Grotius then assumes that in case of the first type of war a neutral state should avoid any action 
that might strengthen the unjust side or, on the contrary, be a hindrance to the just party. In 
addition, in case of a war when the identity of the just side is undetermined, the neutral should 
follow the line of impartiality and regard both belligerents as equals. Grotius understands 
neutrality mainly as a policy of value judgement, i.e. its meaning puts up with the specific nature 
of the relevant war (Karsh, 1988, p. 15).  
The legal fundamental principles of neutrality were shaped by a set of rules manifested in the 
1907 Hague Conventions, which indicated the way of behaving for neutral states in time of war 
(Fischer, Aunesluoma and Makko, 2016, p 5).  
Out of the 13 conventions, the matter of neutrality was covered in five conventions: the Hague 
Convention (V) respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land, the 
Hague Convention (VIII) relating to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines, the Hague 
Convention (XI) relative to certain restrictions with regard to the exercise of the right of capture 
10 
 
in naval war, the Hague Convention (XII) relative to the creation of an International Prize Court, 
and the Hague Convention (XIII) relating to the rights and duties of neutral Powers in naval war. 
(Gavouneli, 2012) This code of regulations maintains a legal functioning core of neutrality 
today, despite the fact that it was drafted a century ago. The most important feature of the Hague 
Conventions is a right to the inviolability of neutral state’s territory and a respect for maintaining 
its neutral status by warring parties. In addition, the principle of abstention obliges a neutral state 
to suppress any military assistance to belligerents, including preventing their actions on its 
territory, in its airspace, and in its territorial waters. The obligation of equal treatment supposes 
equal applying of all possible non-military measures by a neutral state, e.g. export restrictions or 
embargoes, to all belligerents. In turn, a neutral state has to comply with certain restrictions 
enforced by the belligerents, e.g. limits on international transports or trade (Fischer, Aunesluoma 
and Makko, 2016, p.5).  
The end of the Cold War, followed by the European integration process, supposed neutrality to 
become extinct in the new world order, however, the issue of neutrality has survived and given 
rise to much controversy in certain countries.  Moreover, recent events of 2014, the Crimean 
annexation in particular, caused a new wave of debates on whether neutrality was a strategic 
choice for a state to follow (Brzezinski, 2014; Fischer, Aunesluoma and Makko, 2016; Kissinger, 
2014; Mearsheimer, 2014).  It is worth noticing that one of the most prominent foreign 
policymakers of the past century Henry Kissinger took an active part in those debates (Kissinger, 
2014). This means that neutrality has become an important feature of contemporary international 
politics.  
Although neutrality was shaped within the balance of power system, a neutral behaviour does not 
correspond to the rules of that system, when states strive for more power, and security is a 
primary strategic goal. There are also contradictions between the use of neutrality and the 
behaviour of weak or small states, as it is considered that they are likely to bandwagon or enter 
alliances with stronger states in order to protect their interests (Agius, 2006, p. 42). For example, 
Belgium did not join Germany in WWI, as well as Finland decided to fight against Russia during 
the 1939–40 Winter War. These instances illustrate how alignment behaviour of certain states 
can be inconsistent with the expectations of alliance, and the need for researching explanations 
of particular alignment choices.  
On the one hand, the choice for a nation of entering an alliance or remaining neutral is 
determined by the benefits provided - an alliance ensures an extended deterrence and assistance 
in case of war, and neutrality avoids being dragged into the wars of others in general (Karsh, 
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1988, p. 21).  On the other hand, the costs must be calculated as well, because a neutral state has 
no allies to deter potential aggressor. Therefore, there is no universal answer of whether 
neutrality or alliance is the preferable strategic choice for all states at all times. However, it 
would be much of a simplification to define one state’s alignment behaviour in a dichotomous 
choice as either allied or neutral (Reiter, 1994).  
Neutral states were usually located on the periphery and mostly were not taken into account 
within the ‘system of enemies and allies’, i.e. the Cold War era. Austria saw neutrality as a way 
to gain sovereignty and to deviate from the image of Germany. Irish neutrality, for the most part, 
allowed of distancing from the UK affairs (Fanning, 1996). The end of the Cold War made some 
countries to rethink and re-conceptualize the policy of neutrality. In 1991at the session in Accra 
the Non-Alignment Movement explained its new vision on neutrality and nonalignment: 
‘Whereas neutrality as non-participation in a given armed conflict remains certainly an option in 
the future, permanent neutrality as a lasting policy needs re-thinking and may have to be adjusted 
to changing circumstances in Europe and worldwide’ (Agius, 2006, p. 41).  
On the one hand, international organizations like the EU have become a favourable choice for 
some small states. A neutral policy did not fit in the image of the European CSDP. Däniker 
claims that “neutrality is viable in the post-cold war world only when states have a favourable 
geostrategic location, a will to remain out of wars, and reliable defence forces” (Morris and 
White, 2011, p. 105). Some scholars assume that neutrality is inefficient strategic choice at all to 
deal with numerous security issues in nowadays international system due to its adherence to 
isolationist principle. On the other hand, neutral states still exist and stand firmly for its status in 
the post-Cold War era. Moreover, not all neutral states are considered to be small or weak 
powers. In some instances the national adherence of a state to the principle of non-violence 
determines its alignment behaviour, as in case of India. Its struggle for independence was noted 
for non-violent resistance, so later India decided on remaining non-allied from the superpower 
blocs. Neutrality has become a part of the nation-state idea today, and neutral states define their 
policies in different ways. 
There are many opinions in the scholarly community that regard neutrality as an outmoded 
concept. Goetschel claims that “neutrality is not seriously discussed anymore, but seen as a relic 
from the cold war, hampering participation in collective security endeavours” (Goetschel, 1999). 
Most of the recent studies on neutrality examine separate cases of countries, however, it has been 
done little so far to develop a concrete theory of contemporary neutrality. At the same time, the 
concept of neutrality has endured because states keep following a neutral stance, and their 
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publics are anxious about possible abandoning this policy line (Morris and White, 2011). 
Although legal experts affirm that permanent neutrality can exist together successfully with the 
participation in international organisations such as the EU (Subedi, 1993), the tension between 
these two statuses still may be present. Neutrality has passed several stages of development - 
from a purely legal concept to a political concept, which gives more opportunities today to set up 
special relationship between neutrality and membership in an international organization (Andrën, 
1991).  
Moreover, neutrality comprises legal and political dimensions. Among the legal findings of 
neutrality meaning, it can be understood as a right of nation to remain at peace with other 
nations. The international law differentiates occasional or ad hoc neutrality from permanent or 
perpetual neutrality. Permanently neutral country is bound to keep its neutral status in all future 
wars, as Switzerland agreed to its permanent neutrality by signing a multilateral agreement with 
the great powers at the Congress of Vienna, or Turkmenistan fixed its permanent neutral status in 
the Constitution, previously ratified by the UN resolution. Karsh defines permanent neutrality as 
“a policy of consistent non-alignment in peacetime, overtly aimed at preparing the ground for 
neutrality in wartime” (Karsh, 1988, p 25). As a rule, the official status of neutral state is 
introduced by means of domestic legislation or international treaties, which facilitate the 
international recognition of permanent neutrality. Great powers of the international arena usually 
act as the second parties to these treaties and guarantee to respect the neutral status of a state, its 
territorial integrity and, in addition, to render aid in case of attack by foreign forces (Karsh, 
1988, p 25-26).  
By contrast, occasionally neutral country exercises its status during particular war and only for 
the duration of that war. Sweden’s and Finland’s neutral statuses are considered to be examples 
in this case, as they stick to a tradition of neutrality based mostly on foreign policy strategies, but 
not on international legal obligations. In this context, Sweden and Finland can be regarded even 
as de facto military non-aligned countries, not permanently neutral.   
During wartime there is no difference between the rights and obligations of an occasionally 
neutral state and a permanently neutral state. However, the rules of the Hague Conventions shape 
the foreign policy of a permanently neutral state in peacetime as well, creating political 
dimension of neutrality. A policy of neutrality is aimed at preservation and reinforcing the law of 
neutrality. Gabriel notes that “for an occasional neutral country, this embraces actions to prevent 
being drawn into a particular ongoing conflict. For a permanent neutral power, the implications 
are broader: it should do nothing to undermine the practicability and, equally important, the 
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credibility of its neutrality in a future war. A permanent neutral, therefore, should not enter into 
peacetime alliances or permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil” (Gabriel, 
2002). Moreover, the neutral stance in peacetime is a matter of duty for states with permanent 
neutrality regulated by law, such as Switzerland. De facto neutral states, such as Sweden and 
Finland, can abandon the neutral policy, in principle, at any time (Möller and Bjereld, 2010).  
In some cases an international agreement may impose a policy of permanent neutrality on a 
certain state, leaving it to deal with its new status and respective obligations. Such forced choice 
of a neutral course is called neutralization, and it was implemented several times throughout 
history, i.e. Switzerland, Belgium and Austria. Moreover, the idea or permanent neutrality and 
neutralization is able to strengthen political dimension of neutrality, making a neutral status more 
credible and viable strategic choice for a certain country (Karsh, 1988, p. 26).  
Neutrality can be understood conceptually as a certain degree of alignment behaviour. Michael 
Ward highlights that “alignment is not signified by formal treaties, but is delineated by a variety 
of behavioural actions” (Ward, 1982). Snyder adds that alliance is merely a subset to the broader 
phenomenon of alignment (Snyder, 1984). Many studies assume that ‘alignment’ requires no 
definition and that only ‘small powers’ seek alignment with the great powers (Wilkins, 2012). In 
former times neutrality was regarded as an alternative to alliance membership, however, 
nowadays states have got several options or models to implement in order to follow a neutral 
course (Goetschel, 1999). A non-aligned or military non-aligned policy is one of the alignment 
strategies, followed by the West European neutrals in the post-Cold War setting (Agius, 2006, p. 
33). It is therefore possible, and necessary, to conceptually distinguish between neutrality and 
other related concepts, such as non-alignment. 
Non-alignment comes from the context of the Cold War, as it means a political position for 
countries, but not legal in avoiding entanglement in superpower conflicts (Raymond, 1997). 
During the Cold War a number of newly independent states rejected a choice of joining the 
contending ‘camps’ of superpowers or joining a warring side in their conflict. The 1961 
Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the 25 nonaligned countries fixed the criteria 
for a nonaligned country: “A nonaligned country should adopt an independent foreign policy 
based on co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on nonalignment, 
or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy, and consistently support movements of 
national independence. Such a State must not be a member of a multilateral military alliance 
concluded in the context of the Great Power conflict; if it has a bilateral military agreement with 
a Great Power or if it is a member of a regional defence pact, such an agreement or pact should 
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not be deliberately concluded in the context of the Great Power conflicts” (Fischer, Aunesluoma 
and Makko, 2016, p.6). This means that in practice a non-aligned country could have some level 
of defence and military cooperation with other actors. The non-alignment movement started from 
India, and then it spread to African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Among European 
countries non-alignment stance was followed by Yugoslavia and Cyprus.  
According to Robert Rothstein, “the viability of non-alignment is, therefore, directly related to 
the power balance between the Great Powers” (Rothstein, 1969). To be non-aligned simply 
means that the state is not a member of two rival military alliances. Non-alignment was a moral 
obligation for certain states to stay outside the bloc structures. Moreover, non-alignment strived 
for such goals as democratization of the international system, reforming the world economic 
order and safeguarding the national sovereignty (Fischer, Aunesluoma and Makko, 2016, p.9). 
This status, however, is not based on any neutral rights and duties, nor is related to the legal 
status, such as permanent neutrality. It is mainly a political concept, aimed at promoting peace 
and stability in international relations. Karsh adds to this understanding that non-aligned stated 
would be obliged to declare itself either neutral or at war, as non-aligned status does not preclude 
neutrality in all the conflicts (Karsh, 1988, p. 28). When the national interests are concerned, 
nonaligned states possess all rights and opportunities to wage a war. With the end of the Cold 
War  it can be argued that non-alignment has gained a new meaning, referring to nations that 
follow the principle of neutrality and take an active part in defence or security alliances. 
Neutralism is a similar concept to non-alignment, as it is also a political concept and has its roots 
in the Cold War. Karsh explains it as “a policy of non-alignment with a particular side in the 
confrontation between the two superpower blocs” (Karsh, 1988, p. 29). Neutralism differs from 
the idea of neutrality in the institutionalization of its status, as neutralism exists in a political 
dimension, but not in the international law. Besides, this concept is not linked to the concept of 
war, whereas neutrality, in principle, originates from the war. 
Consequently, permanent neutrality is the legal and political status of the state, which refuses to 
participate in the war between other states, refuses military assistance to the conflicting parties, 
and refuses to participate in military blocs in peacetime. Such status is usually fixed by the 
international treaty, and its signatories are obliged to respect the permanent neutral status of the 
state. Non-alignment is basically the country's foreign policy, according to which it declares a 
policy of non-joining military blocs or alliances. As a rule, the non-aligned status of the country 
is determined independently, without any guarantees or international assurances from other 
states, and that is one of the main differences from permanent neutrality. For the most part, non-
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alignment can be seen as a ‘weak’ form of neutrality, when the state does not comply with all 
formal conditions to be considered neutral. 
Rephrasing Alexander Wendt, “neutrality is what states make of it”. Joenniemi says even more 
explicitly that “all the neutrals tend to stress their individual features rather than those that are 
common to them all” (Joenniemi, 1988). Neutral states can be active or passive, and exercise 
their policies differently, e.g. participate in international organisations or not. Sweden can be an 
example of active neutrality, as it manages, to promote and extend this policy choice in the 
international arena by developing aid policy, supporting small states and opposing superpower 
modes of behaviours in the UN (Agius, 2006, p. 54).  
Among various interpretations, neutrality can be seen as a part of the balance of power or as an 
alternative policy, aiming at peace promotion. Some regard it as a dead concept, leading to an 
end, but, at the same time, it is a safe passage from the war. Nevertheless, neutrality is a flexible 
concept, comprised of different ideas about conflict and peace with differing roles and forms. 
 
1.2 Theories of neutrality 
This section describes the theoretical framework of the concept of neutrality and its derivatives. 
When analysing the decision behind neutrality, scholars provide different underlying factors. 
Such variety in explanations is caused by the absence of a common theory of neutrality. In 
absence of such a theory, alternative accounts of neutrality can be formulated on the basis of the 
existing literature on neutrality and the mechanisms underpinning alignment behaviour in world 
politics. These explanations can be divided into three broad categories, each explaining 
neutrality with regard to a different factor or set of factors. First, a geopolitical explanation 
where the geopolitical environment determines the choice of neutral model for a certain state. 
Second a domestic-level explanation, i.e. domestic security issues may influence the decision on 
the neutrality. Third, the identity can be a main factor in explaining neutrality.  
A geopolitical explanation comes from the realist and neorealist views that in general dominate 
the modern understanding of international relations. It is assumed that the level of external threat 
determines the alignment behaviour (Walt, 1985, p. 4). According to Walt, there are options of 
balancing (when a state allies against the source of threat) and bandwagoning (when a state allies 
with the source of threat) (Walt, 1985, p. 5). He then argues that the probability of alliance, 
either with or against the source of threat, is higher when threat increases, and, by contrast, the 
new alliances is less likely to form when threat decreases (Walt, 1985, p. 5-6). Moreover, 
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neutrality is not an option for a threatened state, rather a state prefers non-alignment or 
bandwagoning in the end. Following the realist perspective, a neutral choice is determined, 
primarily for a small state, by the rational calculation of interests and capabilities within the 
unfriendly international environment. (Jesse, 2006) Therefore, from this assumption the 
hypothesis posits that a benign geopolitical environment contributes to a state choosing 
neutrality, whereas a hostile geopolitical context leads to non-alignment and then, eventually, 
alliance with the strongest power. This also means that there is no option for permanent 
neutrality both in peacetime and wartime. 
However, the realist conceptualisation of neutrality is quite narrow and limited. The dual 
approach to the neutral state from realist perspective assumes that, on the one hand, neutrality is 
an undesirable strategic choice in international relations due to its rejection of war and refusal to 
engage in balancing or alliances. On the other hand, neutral states exist within the hostile 
international system and its structural pressures oblige neutral states to put all efforts in order to 
survive (Agius, 2006, p.56). Moreover, the realist conceptions of the balance of power or the 
capabilities calculations may force a neutral state to take a more militaristic stance, i.e. armed 
neutrality. Thus, neutral states have to be armed in order to safeguard their sovereignty in the 
anarchic international system (Joenniemi, 1988). The neutrality of Belgium during the WWI, for 
example, failed not only because of the unrealized guarantees from the great powers, but also 
because of the insufficient and poor material capabilities of Belgium against the invasion. Hence, 
such realist approach fails to fit the idea of neutrality into its worldview. 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff  highlights that states may “focus on power in an inverted manner, 
seeking security through non-involvement, isolation, neutrality, appeasement, or the acceptance 
of a dependent buffer or satellite status” (Agius, 2006, p. 39). Although the realist thinking 
argues that the anarchy in the international relations conditions the choice of neutrality, it also 
works against such statement. Within the anarchic international system neutrality is an anomaly 
in principle and there is no differentiation between its forms, i.e. permanent neutrality, 
occasional neutrality or non-alignment.  
The realist explanation of the neutrality choice assumes that states follow a neutral stance 
because they are weak and prefer an isolate role in the international system. Nevertheless, not all 
states act in the same way, and not all neutral states share a common background for their choice 
neutrality. The starting conditions in terms of geopolitical context of Ukraine and Turkmenistan 
after gaining independence were in many respects similar. During the period from 1991 to 1995, 
when neither the West nor Russia had a decisive influence in the region, these countries might 
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have used the favourable foreign policy circumstances for promoting their own political courses. 
Ukraine inherited from the Ukrainian SSR a powerful economic base, which had to be 
developed. Gas was a national wealth for Turkmenistan, as well as its transit potential. Ukraine 
also benefited from its geographical position. If Ukraine had to cope with the basing of the Black 
Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Crimea, then on the territory of Turkmenistan the 
operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was based until 1994, 
exercising the coordination of Turkmenistan and Russia in the military sphere. However, even 
the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Turkmenistan did not pose a critical obstacle to 
the movement of this country to neutrality. While the leadership of Turkmenistan aimed the 
entire country's recourses and capabilities to develop and implement a course of neutrality, 25 
years of Ukraine's independence ware marked with the constant uncertainty in the foreign policy 
course: the EU or the Customs Union, NATO or non-aligned status. 
Neutrality can be adopted by some states in order to protect trade, or as part of nation-state 
building, or as a way to protect themselves against external interference, i.e. to protect their 
sovereignty. As one of the goals of the sovereign state is to obtain security, neutral states 
conform to such idea, but through different means. Neutrality, in this case, contributes to the 
safeguarding of state sovereignty by remaining outside of conflict. Neutrality strives for 
sovereignty, but posing itself as “a kind of deviant behaviour that does not play the tune of 
balance of power policies” (Albrecht et al., 1988, p. 1).  
Realists believe that neutral states rationally choose to stay out of wars and join one power side 
or another in order to achieve strategic goals like survival. Survival more often than not is better 
achieved by alignment rather that by neutrality. For realists it is hard to explain the presence of 
neutral states, especially in Europe, within modern international system, because neutrals are not 
part of the balance of power that is the focus of the realist analysis of world politics. That is why 
neutrality does not easily comply with the realist theory that is mainly concentrated on war and 
alliance structures. So, in the post-cold war world scholars have increasingly searched for other 
approaches to explain neutrality.  
The second explanation is a domestic-level explanation. It is rooted in the liberal theories, 
assuming that domestic factors contribute to the alignment choices and maintenance of 
neutrality, in particular. Snyder gives an example of the 1904 Anglo-French Entente, which 
would not have occurred if the Radical wing of the British Liberal party had taken a lead in the 
foreign policy posts in the Cabinet at that time (Snyder, 1984).  
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It is argued from the neoliberal perspective that the domestic influences, like economic, political 
and military factors, and also security concern of the regime may be the source of the neutral 
choice and its continuation.   Examining the case of Ireland, Jesse supports neoliberal arguments 
about party politics impact on Irish neutrality, arguing that “it is obvious that realist theory 
grossly underestimates the contributions of domestic factors to the establishment and 
maintenance of Irish neutrality” (Jesse, 2006). In the 2001 EU Nice Treaty referendum the 
proposal was defeated as the voters in Ireland viewed the Treaty as a threat to Irish neutrality, 
despite massive support in favour of the Treaty from the political parties, institutions and most of 
the interest groups. Ireland had to address the EU Heads of State in order to assure the public that 
the Nice Treaty would not affect the Irish neutrality. The public managed, in this case, to affect 
the conduct of international affairs due to the strength of its opinion that brought the issue of 
neutrality to the EU agenda, despite the efforts of pro-Treaty interest groups, major political 
parties and the government (Devine, 2008).  
In addition, David articulates a theory of omnibalancing, where “the most powerful determinant 
of alignments is the rational calculation of leaders as to which outside power is most likely to 
keep them in power” (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, 328). This theory focuses on the internal threats 
to leaders, including assassination attempts, coups, civil war, concerning leader’s personal 
survival, and opposition leaders or parties that may pose threat to leader’s political survival 
(David, 1991).  
According to David, leaders are likely to choose an external alignment in order to remove the 
most pressing domestic threats, although such external alignment may present secondary, yet 
security threat as well. David explains that “leaders protect themselves at the expense of 
promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants” (David, 
1991). It can be concluded that the threatened leader is likely to join an alliance with the 
powerful actor in order to balance his internal threats (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 331). Thus, a 
leader within politically stable regime may choose to follow a neutral stance over being dragged 
into an alliance, or a leader might opt for neutrality if this is most beneficial for regime security. 
The realist theories such as balance-of-power do not take into account domestic factors, focusing 
primarily on the external environment. However, leaders often identify internal issues to be the 
most pressing, for instance a conflict within a state, so the alignment calculations are made with 
respect to domestic factors in the first place. 
Furthermore, when choosing alignment behaviour, leaders must take into consideration social 
and economic constraints that limit the availability of resources in society and the government's 
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access to those resources. (Barnett and Levy, 1991). It is assumed that leaders seek an external 
alliance, if such alliance may contribute to the internal political or economic stability, e.g. to 
ensure the availability of material resources for challenging domestic threats to the regime. 
Conversely, they opt for neutrality if leaders consolidate their power within the political regime 
and they want to preserve their legitimacy. Based on these assumptions, the hypothesis 
concludes that the regime security issues may determine the neutral model, where politically and 
economically stable regime can pursue a course of permanent neutrality, and a threatened regime 
is likely to adopt the non-aligned status with further intentions to conclude an external alliance. 
The ideational explanation of the alignment choice comes from the constructivist theory. The 
modern theories of neutrality are based for the most part on the assumptions of constructivism. 
Scholars have become more interested recently in examining the ideological notion of neutrality 
rather than the legal perspective. Constructivists highlight the valuable role of a neutral foreign 
policy option and its contribution to the international integration process (Morris and White, 
2011).  Goetschel, for example, assumes that “the security identity of states plays a prominent 
role in determining a state’s willingness to forego the autonomy that neutrality ensures for the 
advantages perceived by international integration” (Goetschel, 1999). 
Constructivism tries to analyse the impact of ideas, identities and norms. Constructivists posit 
that people act towards objects and other actors on the basis of the meanings that the objects 
have for them (Agius, 2006) .Wallace explains that “states cannot survive without a sense of 
identity, an image of what marks their government and their citizens from their neighbours, of 
what special contribution they have to make to civilization and international order; and foreign 
policy is partly a reflection of that search for identity” (Wallace, 1991). Adler argues that 
“identity is part of a historical process of interaction which consolidates practices and beliefs, 
creating norms, which in turn determine action” (Adler, 1997). Moreover, different factors can 
influence the process of the identity constructing like collective meanings, culture, norms, even 
metaphors and myths. Berger and Luckmann, for instance, highlight that myths “inform the 
reality of everyday life, sometimes in a very decisive way” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
Norms and identity are connected, as norms set a behaviour model for and nations, and primary 
norms at one level may define specific norms at another level (Klowert and Legro, 1996).  
Wendt acknowledges that the state’s conception of ‘self’ is incomplete without an idea about the 
‘other’. Nevertheless, Wendt then assumes that actors create the structure through their interests 
and the influence of their norms. On the example of the anarchy in the international system, he 
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explains that identities are constructed interactively, producing a particular set of meanings and 
then identities inform actions (Wendt, 1992).  
Following this idea, constructivists assert that the alignment behaviour is a reflection of state’s 
values and a projection of its national identity in international affairs. States produce different 
reactions to phenomena as a result of historically embedded perceptions of self and other, norms, 
values, practices and the meanings attributed to the internal and external factors (Agius, 2006, p. 
43).  Furthermore, neutral states do not behave in one pattern as well. It is the constructivist point 
of view that each state adheres to its own unique understanding of neutrality on the basis of its 
history and identity. Switzerland, for example, views its neutrality in a different way than 
Sweden. That is why neutrality is not merely a foreign policy course adopted out of necessity or 
coercion, but it is a part of the historical experiences of nation-state building, culture and 
practices which are constructed over a period of time (Agius, 2006, p. 44). Neutrality can be seen 
as a matter of identity.  
It makes constructivist researches and studies on neutrality more valuable and deep, compared to 
the realist thinking, as they focus on the internal factors from a state’s history and identity to 
define the meaning and significance of neutrality in a certain context, rather than bringing all 
neutral states to one historic and legal definition of neutrality. 
As constructivists explain, neutrality has taken a significant part in constructing nation-state 
identity. Neutrality has become a national symbol or image of identity, which links people to the 
state. Moreover, a neutral course of state can provide basis for pursuing other aspects of nation-
state building and international activities. In this context, foreign and security policies are 
exposed to the impact of the nation-state identity. When neutrality is deeply rooted in the 
national identity, it can strengthen the desire of a state to maintain its policy of neutrality, so, 
therefore, it is difficult for a state to join an alliance or to enter an institution that would require 
abolition or at least an adjustment of that constructed identity (Morris and White, 2011.) 
Ultimately, the hypothesis follows that the more the idea of neutrality is embedded into the 
state’s identity, the more likely this state is willing to adopt permanent neutrality, rather than 
non-aligned status. 
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Part 2 
Research methodology 
The research design of this thesis is a comparative study of the MSSD. The goal of any MSSD 
study is to determine a set of variables, taken into account with the selection of a particular set of 
cases. The set of cases of this study includes Ukraine and Turkmenistan. 
Ukraine declared a neutral status several times during its independent history, however has not 
succeeded in institutionalizing it and therefore, remains merely non-aligned. Developing the 
foreign strategy, Ukrainian officials used at the same time ‘neutral’ and ‘non-aligned’ terms in 
legislation, paying little attention to different contexts of these terms. In order to fill possible 
Ukrainian neutral status with concrete content, it is relevant to understand the preconditions of a 
particular neutral model, to analyze and compare the experience from other countries.  This may 
help in deciding whether such model is acceptable and viable in Ukraine. 
The analogy with the Western European countries for Ukraine is not completely relevant: the 
conflict in the Donbass, the occupied Crimea and the incomplete demarcation of borders are 
important factors that significantly differentiate the security context of Ukraine from the context 
of the Western European countries. The situation in the Central Asian region is quite different 
from the European security context. A remarkable example is Turkmenistan, which has a 
common border with Iran, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. For this country, the issue of territorial 
integrity and threats from neighbours related to terrorism, separatism, escalation of hostilities in 
these countries is extremely important. Obviously, the European model of neutrality for this 
country is absolutely inappropriate. That is why Turkmenistan has developed its own model of 
permanent neutrality, named ‘positive’ or ‘constructive’ neutrality. This country created the first 
precedent in the international law, when its neutral status was adopted by a special resolution of 
the UN General Assembly.  
The study assumes that starting positions of Ukraine and Turkmenistan in the geopolitical 
context after gaining independence were very similar. A unique transit geographical position was 
considered to be a national wealth for Ukraine and for Turkmenistan as well. The basing of the 
Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea was not a feature of Ukraine that distinguished from 
Turkmenistan. On the territory of Turkmenistan a large grouping of Soviet and then Russian 
troops was based. However, the presence of Russian troops did not interfered the process of the 
neutrality adoption in Turkmenistan.  
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In order to measure the degree of institutionalization of neutrality, this study will search for 
explicit legal declarations at the constitutional level, international treaties, anchoring the neutral 
status in (the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan 1992; the Constitution of Ukraine 
1996, the Law of Ukraine “On amending some laws concerning the rejection of the non-
alignment policy implementation” 2014). In turn, non-alignment is indicated by rejection from 
participation in any interstate coalition or military alliance. In order to prove non-participation of 
the given cases in military alliances, the study will use the data the Alliance Treaty Obligations 
and Provisions (ATOP) project and the data set on formal alliances from the Correlates of War 
project (COW). They provide information about the content of military alliance agreements 
signed by all countries of the world between 1815 and 2012 (ATOP only until 2003), including 
mutual defence pacts, non-aggression treaties, and ententes. In addition, the study will rely upon 
foreign policy reports, which reveal the state adherence to certain alignment pattern. In order to 
measure factors explaining for degree of institutionalization, this study looks at the political 
development of the given cases, domestic cleavages, presence of domestic upheaval, the regime 
type, the nation-building process. The study will use Freedom House’s reports in defining 
political regimes (Freedom House, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2011).  
For the theoretical part, this thesis uses recent studies on explaining the notion of neutrality from 
constructivist approaches, as the dominant realist approaches fail to explain why neutrality has 
been maintained in general since the end of the Cold War. Constructivists emphasize on the 
domestic beliefs and identity-based sources of neutrality (Agius and Devine, 2011; Eliasson, 
2004). Considering the regime security issues, Snyder gives an example of the 1904 Anglo-
French Entente, which would not have occurred if the Radical wing of the British Liberal party 
had taken a lead in the foreign policy posts in the Cabinet at that time (Snyder, 1984). Steven 
David articulates a theory of omnibalancing, where ‘the most powerful determinant of 
alignments is the rational calculation of leaders as to which outside power is most likely to keep 
them in power' (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005).  
For identifying the factors that caused different approaches to the neutral status in the case 
studies, this thesis provides the following explanations: the level of domestic threats along with 
the national identity cause a particular choice of the neutral model. This thesis argues that an 
internally secured political regime prefers permanent neutrality, and a regime, faced with internal 
threats, chooses non-alignment and possible external alliance in the future. Regarding the 
national identity, it is assumed that foreign policy can be a reflection of state’s values and a 
projection of its national identity in international affairs. A geopolitical explanation is eliminated 
from the theoretical framework of this thesis, as its postulates do not explain the choices of 
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permanent neutrality and non-alignment, but, on the contrary, they contradict the real state of 
affairs in the case studies. Domestic factors as well as identity factors, can explain difference in 
behaviour of states, which face a similar geopolitical context, yet behave differently. That is why 
this study focuses only on domestic and identity explanations.  
On the basis of the preceding theoretical discussion, this thesis puts forward the following 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis is based on a domestic level explanation of the alignment 
behaviour. It states the more consolidated a regime, the higher the degree of institutionalization 
of neutrality. The second hypothesis is derived from a constructivist approach of alignment 
behaviour. It assumes that the more the idea of neutrality forms part of national identity, the 
higher the degree of institutionalization of neutrality. 
 
Data and sources 
The form of neutrality is measured by the adherence of a stated to certain neutral model, based 
on shared values norms and historical alignments. For this purpose, the study relies on foreign 
policy reports sources. In addition, the legal anchoring of neutral statuses is exemplified in 
explicit declarations, international treaties, laws, foreign policy doctrines, national security 
strategies. 
In order to assess the factors accounting for the choice of neutrality, I investigate the nation-
building process and the political regime development in Turkmenistan and Ukraine, relying on 
the findings from articles, reviews and analysis on the foreign policy. In addition, the study relies 
on the researches of Ukrainian scholars, which focus on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
neutral status for Ukraine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Part 3 
Comparing Ukraine’s and Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality 
3.1 Domestic-level explanation of non-aligned status of Ukraine  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and gaining independence, Ukraine chose an appropriate 
independent alignment policy course. The idea of neutrality and non-aligned status of Ukraine 
was enshrined in the Declaration on State Sovereignty. That document referred to the intention 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to become a permanently neutral state in the future that does 
not participate in military blocs. The proclamation of this intention played a positive role 
especially during the first years of independence, when Ukraine experienced tangible external 
pressures. It is the non-aligned and non-nuclear status of Ukraine that greatly simplified the rapid 
process of recognizing the independence of Ukraine by European countries and the whole world 
in general. 
Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, aimed at distancing Ukraine from Russia as far as 
possible. He had to devote all his efforts at maintaining Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, 
and thus, President Kravchuk took a firm position on Russian terms in settling a range of issues 
between Ukraine and Russia, such as storing nuclear weapons in Ukraine or locating former 
Soviet military bases (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 339). The non-aligned status became an 
effective tool for Kyiv to counteract reintegration processes in the territory of the former USSR, 
in particular, Kyiv refused to participate in the institutionalization of intergovernmental relations 
within the CIS and opposed granting the Commonwealth status of a subject of international law. 
Moreover, President Kravchuk spoke critically of the CIS integration, regarding this organization 
as “a committee to liquidate the old structures” that provided a “civilized divorce” of former 
Soviet republics. He highlighted that the CIS should focus on the principles promoted by the UN 
and the OSCE, and that the CIS should remain an international organization for facilitating the 
resolution of problems and issues among member states without intensions to become a 
supranational institution (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 339-340).  In addition, President 
Kravchuk rejected plans of the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, as he considered that 
agreement as an excuse for possible Russian military intervention in the future. 
Nevertheless, the concept of Ukrainian neutrality and the transformation of the international 
relations system and its constituents subsequently influenced the evolution of the foreign policy 
course of the state. Thus, the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine, approved by the Verkhovna 
Rada on July 2, 1993, emphasized that the proclaimed once the intention to become a neutral and 
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non-aligned state in the future could not be considered an obstacle to the state’s full participation 
in the European security structure. As Ukraine is located at the intersection of key routes in 
Europe and Asia, the neutral status would, deprive it of the maneuver, essential for maintaining 
multilateral contacts, promoting national interests and guaranteeing its security.  
As President Kravchuk faced little opposition in the government there was no need for him to 
seek external alliance with Russia in order to stay in power, and besides, such an alliance would 
not be supported by the public opinion at that time. The more pressing foreign policy issue for 
him, however, was establishing contacts with the West. The US maintained quite a Russocentric 
view on Ukraine even after independence, though the Western countries acknowledged their 
support to be vital for successful transition (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 342). In 1991 President 
George H.W. Bush delivered a speech to the Ukrainian parliament, where he noticed that 
“freedom is not the same as independence. . . . [Americans] will not aid those who promote 
suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, 1991) That speech evidenced that the Bush administration was more concerned with 
Ukraine’s role in the collapsing Soviet organization, rather than Ukraine’s interests and 
intensions. Following that logic, the US would rather have one single de facto power in the 
region, instead of dealing with quite unpredictable newly independent former Soviet republics. 
Thus, the first years of Ukraine’s independence marked with distanced relations between the US 
and Ukraine, getting one side of a triangular relationship including Russia (Miller, 2006).When 
relations between Russia and the US became strained in 1993-1994, then the Western powers 
took into consideration an independent Ukraine as a strategic partner in the post-Soviet region. 
In addition, President Kravchuk saw Ukraine’s nuclear weapons as a tool to get more Western 
assistance. The ratification of the START and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was 
conditional on the terms of compensation for nuclear weapons materials, economic assistance for 
Ukraine’s disarmament program and security guarantees from the nuclear powers (Garnett, 
1995). The Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994 by the Russian Federation, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, testified to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. The 
signatories assured Ukraine of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the non-use of 
threat of force or economic pressure, and offered a mechanism for consultations on security 
matters. The memorandum actually broke the link between the non-nuclear and non-aligned 
status, confirming the first one, but not mentioning the second one.  
In 1994 President Kravchuk wasn’t credible to stay in power any longer, and the result of the 
presidential elections confirmed it. His strategy on distancing from Russia and unwillingness to 
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introduce economic reforms put Ukraine into a deep economic crisis. Considering such extreme 
hard economic situation in 1993-1994, President Kravchuck had very few arguments in his 
support at the elections. Nationalist parties were his only strong support. Leonid Kuchma, once a 
prime minister under President Kravchuck, was a serious rival and posed a real political threat to 
the first president. In contrast to President Kravchuck, Kuchma focused on a Russian direction, 
which got support from the eastern and southern regions, known for their pro-Russian orientation 
at that time. He emphasized Ukraine’s “total dependence” on Russia, which was “a key factor in 
Ukraine’s economic development” (Smolansky, 1995). 
President Kuchma's coming to power was marked by new approaches for the implementation of 
the foreign policy course. Improving relations with Russia was the first issue on the agenda, as 
he realized a serious level of Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia. At the same time, 
President Kuchma, as well as his predecessor, did not have intensions to formalize alliance ties 
with Russia. The goal was to improve economic cooperation in the first place. The foreign policy 
course under President Kuchma was called a ‘multivectored’, aimed at developing contacts with 
both Russia and the West.  
Despite the fact that the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine did not establish the relevant provisions 
that would determine neutrality or non-alignment as a means of national security or a form of 
Ukraine's existence in world politics, the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment became the 
main tools of the maneuvering policy of Ukraine between Russia and the West. The peculiarity 
of this policy was the chaotic change of vectors and political slogans: permanent, temporary or 
active neutrality; a simultaneous partnership with the EU, the US and Russia; two-vector; Euro-
Atlantic choice; European and Euro-Atlantic integration while maintaining strategic partnership 
with Russia; the course "to Europe with Russia", the CIS (Vidnyansʹkyy, 2006). In 1997, two 
important events took place: the signing of the Grand Treaty with Russia and the Madrid Charter 
on a special partnership with NATO. Thus, Ukraine, while remaining a non-aligned country, 
began to develop relations with the NATO. Consequently, non-alignment in practice allowed to 
actively strengthening ties with the western direction, while maintaining a distance from 
Moscow. 
President Kuchma succeeded in establishing a winning political coalition, thus, avoiding a 
danger of internal threats, which would make him to seek an external alliance with Russia. 
However, the political scandal at the end of the 1990s forced President Kuchma to reconsider his 
alignment plans, so he decided to strengthen relations with Russia (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 
347). The so-called “Kuchmagate” scandal occurred when particular audiotapes were released 
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allegedly with the voices of President Kuchma, Internal Affairs Minister Yuriy Kravchenko, and 
Presidential Administration Head Volodymyr Lytvyn, linking the president to the disappearance 
of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 348). Such outrageous scandal 
caused massive political protests in Ukraine. In addition, in January 2001 the deputy prime 
minister Yulia Tymoshenko was ousted for her efforts to establish transparent rules for the 
energy sector, which threatened Ukrainian oligarchs and Kuchma’s supporters (Miller, 2006). 
Yulia Tymoshenko’s dismissal only fueled protest against the president. 
Such internal threats only fostered the development of the Eastern vector of President Kuchma’s 
foreign policy course. For instance, in January 2001 a military cooperation plan was signed 
between Ukraine and Russia, intending to create a joint command post in Sevastopol and a joint 
rescue detachment of the Russian and Ukrainian Black See Fleets. Later, in February, Ukrainian 
and Russian officials agreed on a series of arrangements for cooperation in the areas of high 
technology, industry, and energy, culminating in sixteen documents on economic cooperation. 
Moreover, in order to cease domestic opposition, Russia provided a diplomatic support for 
President Kuchma. For example, the ambassador of Russia to Ukraine Anatoliy Chernomyrdin 
actively interfered in the 2002 parliamentary elections, showing off his support for President 
Kuchma and pro-presidential (Miller and Toritsyn, 2005, p. 349).  Nevertheless, the warming 
relations with Russia did not take the form of a formal alliance, even though an external alliance 
would help President Kuchma to overcome internal threats. 
The second Kuchma's presidency was characterized by the transformation of a multi-vector 
policy into an unconditional orientation towards Russia, which respectively led to a deterioration 
of relations with the EU and the US. Moreover, the “Kuchmagate” scandal and the accusation of 
illegal sale of the radar systems ‘Kol’chuga’ to Iraq resulted in the actual international isolation 
of Ukraine, which continued to remain in the geopolitical flow of Russia. A striking illustration 
of that fact was the Prague Summit of NATO on November 22, 2002, where the presidents had 
to be seated in the French alphabet, so that President George W. Bush would not be alongside 
President Kuchma. As a result of such complications, the process of the European integration 
was slowing down, strategic partnership with Poland weakened, Western Europe rejected the 
Ukrainian airplane AN-70 as the basic vehicle for transport aviation, IMF refused to give loans, 
Russia's stance towards supplying and transporting energy resources across Ukraine became 
stricter. All this testified to the crisis of ‘multivectorism’, the loss of logic and consistency of 
Ukrainian foreign policy, and thus, the international image and authority of Ukraine deteriorated 
in the eyes of the world community (Vidnyansʹkyy, 2006, p. 38). 
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In order to free from the actual international isolation, President Kuchma made a decision on the 
participation of the Ukrainian contingent as part of a peacekeeping mission in Iraq. This allowed 
Ukraine to improve relations with the US and NATO, but failed to fully abandon maneuvering 
and neutrality policies. Along with the process of sending Ukrainian troops to Iraq, the 
consideration of the agreement on Ukraine's participation in the Eurasian Economic Space with 
Russia and Kazakhstan began (Vidnyansʹkyy, 2011, p. 31). In May 2002, the National Security 
and Defense Council of Ukraine decided on the necessity of joining NATO. It should be noticed 
that the decision contained an extremely important reservation to the provisions on Euro-Atlantic 
integration, while maintaining good-neighborly relations and strategic partnership with the 
Russian Federation. The crisis of ‘multivectored’and international uncertainty of Ukraine led to a 
conflict in September-December 2003 between Russia and Ukraine around the Tuzla island, and 
it demonstrated the inefficiency of the international security guarantees and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. The incident around the Tuzla 
island was the first and, as it turned out, not the last tense moment in the history of bilateral 
relations. Consequently, non-aligned status became transient, remaining for a period before 
joining the alliance. 
The Orange Revolution and threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine raised 
the issue of Ukraine's geopolitical uncertainty once again. President Viktor Yushchenko won the 
election under the slogans of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, which could not but affect 
relations with Russia, which, in turn, began a powerful propaganda campaign among Ukrainian 
citizens aimed at preserving the non-aligned and neutral status of Ukraine. After all, the question 
on the abolition of the non-aligned status was immediately identified by society with the course 
on joining NATO. The foreign policy situation in Ukraine became much more complicated as a 
result of the gas war with Russia in 2005 and the unwillingness of the EU and the US to make 
real steps towards rapprochement with Ukraine, justifying this reluctance to fears of restoring the 
Cold War with Russia. 
The collapse of the ‘orange team’ intensified the activities of the opposition, which, on the eve of 
the 2006 parliamentary elections, launched active anti-Nazi propaganda, speaking not only 
against Ukraine's accession to NATO, but also about the abolition of its non-aligned status. The 
main arguments of the pro-Russian political forces were that the deepening of relations with 
NATO would lead to Ukraine's involvement in the military actions of the Alliance; placement of 
American troops on the territory of Ukraine, and the main argument that it would spoil relations 
with Russia (Makar, 2008, p, 190). This rhetoric remained one of the main political programs 
and slogans of the pro-Russian forces in the early parliamentary elections of 2007. Demanding 
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an immediate referendum on NATO membership, opponents of the Euro-Atlantic integration 
were counting on the lack of awareness of the Alliance's activities among population. After all, at 
that time Ukrainian public opinion mostly considered NATO as a stereotype of an aggressive 
bloc, formed by the Soviet ideological machine. 
Despite such unpopular stance, the then Ukrainian authorities began active preparations for 
further deepening of cooperation with the Alliance, declaring their readiness to abolish the non-
aligned status of Ukraine, which was simply impossible to achieve without a parliamentary 
majority. A special resonance got the so-called ‘letter of three’. It was a letter with the signatures 
of President Yushchenko, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to the leadership of NATO on providing Ukraine at the Bucharest 
summit in 2008 the possibility of joining to the Alliance's Membership Action Plan. That letter 
led to a long parliamentary confrontation with supporters and opponents of the Euro-Atlantic 
integration (Makar, 2008, p, 194). However, in that letter the emphasis was not on practical 
steps, but on loud declarations, and the permanent political crisis finally transformed the declared 
goal into an inaccessible dream in the foreseeable future. At the same time, for obvious reasons, 
the dialogue with the Kremlin was interrupted. It should be noted that even then Ukraine 
continued to remain outside any of the existing military-political blocs. 
Russia's active opposition to Ukraine's possible accession to the Alliance's Membership Action 
Plan only succeeded with the refusal of France and Germany to immediately support Ukraine's 
desire to deepen its relations with the Alliance at the Bucharest Summit on April 2-4, 2008. This 
position of the leading EU states was perceived by Russia as giving it a carte-blanche for action 
in the post-Soviet republics, as clearly demonstrated by the Russian aggression against Georgia 
in August 2008 (Vidnyansʹkyy, 2011, p. 31). It was the Russian-Georgian war that once again 
actualized the question of the geopolitical status of Ukraine and the guarantees of its territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. However, deep political crisis and the confrontation between the 
President and the Prime Minister, lack of support for the parliamentary majority did not allow 
abolishing the non-aligned status of Ukraine, which would create the necessary political and 
legal preconditions for joining NATO. 
Viktor Yanukovych's victory in the presidential election was a geopolitical victory of Russia, 
which tried to preserve the status quo in the post-Soviet space. Already on March 5, 2010, 
President Yanukovych visited Moscow. For a reduction in gas prices Russian side demanded 
from Ukraine high-quality concessions and guarantees of impossibility of movement in the 
opposite foreign policy direction. The price of gas for Ukraine became an internal political 
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factor. The Kremlin expected a radical geopolitical reorientation from the leadership of Ukraine. 
On April 21, 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev visited Kharkiv, where an agreement on a $ 100 
gas price reduction for Ukraine was signed, and in return, the Ukrainian side agreed to extend the 
term of the deployment of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia by 2042 instead of 2017 (Vidnyansʹkyy, 
2011, p. 34). 
After the 2010 presidential election, Ukraine radically changed its foreign policy priorities in the 
area of security. Such a rapid reorientation to Russia was negatively assessed by the West, 
because in April 2010, President Yanukovych dismissed the commission for preparing Ukraine's 
accession to NATO. At the same time, the Kyiv Court of Appeal banned the referendum on 
Ukraine's accession to NATO. Brussels also expressed its position on the inability of Ukraine to 
simultaneously enter the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the creation 
of a free trade zone with the European Union. Already on July 1, 2010, the Verkhovna Rada 
adopted the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Internal and Foreign Policy”, in which a state 
was identified as a non-aligned European state. On the whole, it can be assumed that this law 
was directed primarily against Ukraine's accession to NATO, while it laid the foundations for 
further economic and political integration with Russia. 
Legally entrenched non-aligned status proved to be a reality that Western and eastern neighbors 
should have taken into account, and within which Ukraine built a national security policy and 
relations with external partners, including with NATO. Russia's categorical non-acceptance of 
NATO's policy on further eastward enlargement, Ukraine's unwillingness to meet NATO's 
criteria, and virtually ‘closed doors’ to the EU and NATO, prompted Ukraine to formally 
withdraw the agenda on the issue of NATO membership in 2010. Ukraine forcedly suspended 
the process of the official Euro-Atlantic integration, as it was in a state of non-alignment. 
The main reasons for changing the foreign policy course in the field of security and the 
introduction of the non-aligned status of Ukraine were the following: low effectiveness of 
Ukraine's policy in the Euro-Atlantic area; political and economic pressure of Russia; the 
influence of the pro-Russian lobby inside the country; low capacity and competitiveness of the 
Ukrainian management elite; the low level of public support for the course on the Euro-Atlantic 
integration due to the lack of information policy within Ukraine. Consequently, the non-aligned 
status should have helped to achieve at least a few goals: distancing from Russia; distancing 
from the EU and NATO; obtaining a neutral status, i.e. distancing from all. 
The victory of the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and, as a result, Russian aggression against 
Ukraine, raised the issue of the status of Ukraine, as in spite of its non-aligned status and actual 
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neutrality, the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons in exchange for the guarantee of 
territorial integrity, Ukraine became the victim of aggression by one of the guarantors of its 
sovereignty, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Undoubtedly, the further 
preservation of the non-aligned status and actual neutrality of Ukraine in the context of Russian 
aggression was identical to the complete loss of not only international subjectivity, but also of its 
own statehood. 
Discussions on the abolition of the non-aligned status and deepening of cooperation with NATO 
began immediately after the overthrow of Yanukovych's regime. Despite the threat to national 
security, the non-aligned status adherents emphasized that changing the geopolitical status of 
Ukraine would only aggravate the confrontation with Russia. Nevertheless, in December 2014, 
the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine 
Regarding Ukraine's Refusal to Implement Non-Aligned Policy”, which provided for 
amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On the Fundamental Principles of National Security of 
Ukraine" and "On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy”. The abolition of 
the non-aligned status created the necessary preconditions for ensuring the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Ukraine by deepening cooperation with NATO and integration into the Euro-
Atlantic security space. At the same time, joining NATO has become an instrument of national 
security policy, which can improve the conditions for solving domestic political problems. 
Neutrality and the non-alignment status for a country with such location and scale as Ukraine are 
considered to be artificial categories. Being neutral in Ukraine means being politically static, and 
in the context of military aggression, being politically static is identical to stagnation. That is 
why the abandonment of the principles of neutrality and non-alignment is a completely object-
oriented and evolutionary process, and in no way cannot be regarded as a betrayal of national 
interests (Zlenko, 2007). After all, at the present stage, the main task for Ukraine is to build a 
democratic, legal and defense capable state that can be an equal member of a united Europe. 
Thus, the evolution of the concepts of neutrality and non-aligned status can be traced within the 
foreign policy courses of independent Ukraine, which were defined by the political situation of 
the state. At the initial stage of independence, neutrality and non-aligned status were aimed at 
preventing Ukraine's involvement in Moscow's projects aimed at reanimation of the USSR; in 
this respect, neutrality was an effective tool for a newly formed state, which needed to define 
with its own guidelines in foreign policy and to regulate internal affairs. However, gradually, the 
non-aligned status became one of the inalienable aspects of the multivectored foreign policy, 
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which did not meet the national interests of Ukraine and led to the actual international isolation 
of the state.  
The identification of the abolition of the non-aligned status with the Euro-Atlantic integration led 
to an intensification of political confrontation not only with Russia, but also in the Ukrainian 
government. Nevertheless, in the face of Russian aggression, the final abolition of the non-
aligned status is an effective step towards further Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, since 
maintaining neutrality and ignoring participation in the Euro-Atlantic system of collective 
security in a war with a nuclear power means the total loss of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The policy of neutrality and non-alignment cannot be regarded as expedient and 
rational today, since Ukraine, being between two competing civilizational systems, is historically 
and objectively doomed to lose its non-aligned status - either voluntarily or coercively. 
 
3.2 Domestic-level explanation of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan  
It can be argued that independence for Turkmenistan was an unexpected event from the point of 
view of its leadership, as well as population. The 1989 all-union referendum demonstrated a vast 
support for the preservation of the Soviet Union and Turkmenistan as a union republic. When 
eventually the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly independent state had only territory and quite 
feeble administrative structure. Some other important characteristics of a state, such as a national 
identity or institutional infrastructure, had not been developed by the time of if independence 
(Esenov, 2001, p. 244). Moreover, there were several attempts to contest Turkmenistan’s 
territorial integrity by neighbouring states. For example, Uzbekistan had some territorial claims 
on the border areas in the Tashauz and Chardzhou regions, which were populated mainly by 
ethnic Uzbeks. In addition, there were certain concerns about political instability spillovers to 
Turkmenistan from other post-Soviet republics.  
In that context, the political leadership of Turkmenistan faced a threat of becoming merely an 
object, absorbed by the regional centres of power. Such prospect was completely unacceptable to 
the newly independent country. Thus, Turkmenistan preferred to adopt rather controversial 
course of development in order to maintain the country’s territorial integrity, to guarantee its 
security, to secure internal and external environment for political and economic reforms in the 
country and to develop Turkmenistan’s raw materials potential and possible export routes 
(Esenov, 2001, p. 245). Thus, by adopting neutral status Turkmenistan would distance itself from 
any regional powers, while establishing contacts with the rest of the world.  
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Usually, the obligation of a certain state to remain permanently neutral is recognized in the 
agreement between other states, as in cases of Switzerland or Austria. In the case of 
Turkmenistan, neutrality does not come from an agreement between other states, which 
recognize this status. The basis for Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality is its unilateral judicial 
acts (Yapici, 2018, p 294). The Constitutional Law on Permanent Neutrality, adopted on 
December 12, 1995, is the primary judicial act of Turkmenistan. The law implies that 
Turkmenistan pursue a peaceful foreign policy (article 3), avoid involvement in military 
alliances (article 4), do not allow the establishment of foreign states’ military bases on its 
territory (article 6) and safeguard its permanent neutrality (article 12) (Constitutional of the 
Republic of Turkmenistan, 2008).  
The first president of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov showed the first signs of developing a 
neutral course of his country at the OSCE Helsinki Summit in July 1992, where he mentioned a 
policy of ‘positive neutrality’. Then, at the third summit of the ECO in May 1995 President 
Niyazov mentioned in his speech that Turkmenistan should adopt a positive neutrality status.  
The ECO member states expressed support for President Niyazov’s proposal and agreed to 
confirm Turkmenistan’s neutral status. In October 1995, the heads of state of the Non-Aligned 
Movement also welcomed the initiative of positive neutrality for Turkmenistan (Esenov, 2001, p. 
246). Thus, on 12 December 1995 the UN General Assembly passed a special resolution 
A/RES/50/80, which formally recognized Turkmenistan’s status as a permanently neutral state 
(Denison, 2008). The newly acquired status of Turkmenistan significantly affected the process of 
nation-building. The military doctrine of Turkmenistan was revised with regard to the neutral 
status, primarily cutting the defence spending and providing the resources for the national 
economy development. It is worth mentioning that the General Assembly resolutions usually 
contain recommendations, especially in the context of external relations with the member states. 
This means that the A/RES/50/80 resolution officially recognizes a permanent neutrality of 
Turkmenistan, but does not guarantee it (Yapici, 2018, p 296).  
President Niyazov built his political regime in Turkmenistan on the basis of his self-styled 
personality cult (Esenov, 2001, p. 248). Initially, President Niyazov relied heavily on external 
support from Russia, rather than on domestic support from local elites (Horák, 2010, pp. 33). 
During the late Soviet period, Niyazov kept his post as a leader of the Turkmen Communist 
Party, so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was elected as the President of Soviet 
Turkmenistan in November 1991, and then, on 21 June 1992, he became the first president of 
independent Turkmenistan in his first and last presidential elections (Kurtov, 2006, pp. 115–
116). President Niyazov never had to run for a president post in another elections, as firstly, the 
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1994 referendum extended his term until 2002 in order to fulfill his ‘Ten Years of Prosperity’ 
(Rudenko, 2004, p. 127). Then, in 1999 there was no need for elections, when President Niyazov 
became the President for Life, due to the ‘overwhelming popular pressure’ (Polese, Ó Beacháin 
and Horák, 2017, p. 433). The Peoples’ Council approved such decision, as they owed their 
appointments to President Niyazov. It can be assumed that such constitutional initiatives allowed 
President Niyazov to neglect public opinion on the matter. 
For securing the international recognition of his regime, President Niyazov focused on 
strengthening ties with the major powers, starting with an official visit to the White House 
Clinton in April 1998 and numerous visits to Moscow. He mostly tried to secure relations with 
the most strategic partners for Turkmenistan, such as Russia, China and Turkey, which usually 
shut their eyes to undemocratic political regime there. A policy of positive neutrality were aimed 
in practice at isolationg Turkmenistan from international obligations, and President Niyazov 
hoped for similar indifference from the rest of the world. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality 
emphasized the importance of neutrality for internal stability of Turkmenistan and highlighted 
‘the preservation of the best conditions for domestic development’ as one of the primary targets 
of the country’s foreign policy (Shikhmuradov and Kepbanov 1997, p. 105).  
The projection and the promotion of the positive neutrality by President Niyazov as an 
ideological leader were only just employed for internal influence. According to President 
Niyazov’s foreign policy course, the Turkmen regime balanced between keeping international 
consensus, as it contributed to the inter-Tajik peace talks, negotiated with the Taliban, faciliated 
relations with Iran and China, and strengthening business connections in order to develop 
Turkmenistan’s natural resources. In this context, President Niyazov realized that as long as 
Turkmenistan provides low prices for gas, so that Russia may re-sell at much greater prices to 
European countries, he gets Kremlin’s protection along with the Western neglect to his regime’s 
imperfections. 
Neutrality has also been a mainstay of both presidential cults, as it provides a legitimacy for 
them. The UN’s recognition of Positive Neutrality is considered to be not only the greatest 
achievement of Turkmenistan’s independent politics, but also as “an unprecedented event in the 
50-years’ history of the United Nations” (Anceschi, 2009, p. 27). Therefore, the policy is 
specified as a ‘permanent symbol’ of President Nyyazow’s unorthodox approach to international 
relations, his diplomatic talents and unconditional international support (Bohr, 2015, p. 44). The 
Turkmen press regularly mentiones that the UN distinguished President Niyazow for his skilled 
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diplomacy and should support him in his attempt to introduce a Turkmen model of neutrality 
(Bohr, 2015, p. 43). 
When the policy of positive neutrality was introduced, this created an official excuse for 
rejecting the 1995Collective Security Concept, the Treaty on Borders’ Protection between the 
CIS and non-CIS states in 1995, and other projects of military alignment in the post-Soviet 
region (Yapici, 2018, p. 299). Turkmenistan did not participate in a number of summits of the 
CIS heads of state, where the joint military activities were discussed. It criticized the CIS 
Interstate Bank, rejected the membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (later the 
Eurasian Economic Union), the Central Asian Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. In August 2005, Turkmenistan, being as the a full member of the CIS, 
changed its status to the ‘associate member’. Turkmenistan authorities viewed this decision as 
‘opinion necessitates’ in accordance with the UN-recognized international neutral status. The 
Turkmen television called that move “a significant step towards the country’s independence” 
(Yapici, 2018, p. 299-300). As Pomfret fair notices that from the very beginning Turkmenistan 
estimated the CIS only as a consultative mechanism. (Pomfret, 2008) By highlighting its 
permanent neutral status, Turkmenistan officials justifies their passive involvement in the CIS 
development. 
In 1995 Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian state that joined NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace programme. However, it kept quite a distance not to be involved in certain military 
cooperation initiatives by the PfP. The Turkmenistan‒NATO partnership exercises its activities 
in combating terrorism, civil emergency planning and environment protection. In addition, after 
the 9/11 attacks, contrary to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan didn’t allow the usage of 
its air base for attacking Afghanistan by the US, although Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan allowed it 
from their territories (Tanrısever, 2013). Turkmenistan only provided its support to the US 
military operations with humanitarian and refueling missions. Turkmenistan also did not give the 
US military any maintenance supply during the 2003 war in Iraq, emphasizing its neutrality 
(Anceschi, 2009, p. 119). After the coloured revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan’s negative attitude towards the United increased. In 2005, Turkmen officials had 
to oppose rumours about establishing a US military base in southern Turkmenistan. Assessing 
the level of American interference in the coloured revolutions, the Turkmen regime viewed the 
US as an external security (Yapici, 2018, p. 300). The positive neutrality rhetoric once again 
became the key aspect of the ruling elite’s political discourse.  
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It can be noticed that Turkmenistan’s positive neutrality also serves as a means for improving 
trade connections and energy policy. In order to become a main energy and transit hub in Asia, 
Turkmenistan uses its positive neutrality in developing its trade and transit connections. In this 
context, the relations with Afghanistan, Armenia, China and Iran were improved. Denison 
notices that “Turkmenistan uses its neutral status in order to maintain good relations using all 
kinds of regimes so that to preserve both transit route options and export markets for Turkmen 
gas” (Denison, 2008). Annette Bohr adds that ‘the declaration of neutrality was designed to 
strengthen Turkmenistan’s independence by enabling it to develop diplomatic and trade links 
with a variety of sovereign states, while avoiding entanglement in the conflicts of its 
unpredictable neighbours” (Bohr, 2015, p. 453) .  
Nevertheless, the vague Doctrine of Positive Neutrality has been considerably manipulated in 
order to highlight supposed changes in the regime. Moreover, the neutral policy has been closely 
tied to its ‘rightful’ guardian President Berdimuhamedow. Essentially, positive neutrality serves 
as a source of international legitimacy for the current regime in Turkmenistan, so by associating 
himself with this policy, President Berdimuhamedow continues to follow the main legitimizing 
discourse of the Nyyazow era (Esenov, 2001, p. 245). 
After the death of President Nyyazow on December 21, 2006, it was expected that his successor 
would introduce a “Khruschevian thaw” in Turkmenistan (Peyrous, 2012, p. 108). However, in 
practice President Berdimuhamedow largely obeyed the authoritarian regime of the first 
president. The political and institutional spheres have undergone no significant reforms, and no 
liberalization prospect for the political regime has been noticed. President Berdimuhamedow’s 
leadership continues to oppose internal and external pressures for democratization. Turkmenistan 
is well-known for the most repressive in the post-Soviet space and one of the top ten most 
authoritarian regimes in the world. The frequent indignations, which are expressed on the poor 
human rights situation in the country by the international community, are the convincing proof of 
the gravity of the situation.  
Concerning the domestic aspect, the leadership preferred a policy of total domination over the 
de-centralization policy, which was viewed in a similar way as destabilization. At the same time 
President Berdimuhamedow employed quite sophisticated political strategies such as 
liberalization of the regime rhetoric and introduction of multi-party-candidate elections. These 
strategies were aimed at securing the regime’s legitimacy, ideological distancing from the 
President Nyyazow’s regime and reinforcing the authority of the new leader. 
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In addition, President Berdimuhamedow had to come up with the new regime’s response to the 
changing international environment. The Turkmen regime is notable for implementing human 
rights rhetoric and progressive domestic reforms as a veil for constant human rights abuse in the 
country. The Doctrine of Positive Neutrality has once again found its application in this context. 
The regime highlighted the human rights rhetoric, embedded in positive neutrality, with signing 
major human rights treaties in order to get Western support for the regime and potential business 
investments. Improving its international prestige, Turkmenistan took part in small-scale peace-
building initiatives in the region, mainly with regard to Tajikistan and Afganistan. 
The Foreign Policy Concept of Turkmenistan as a Neutral State states that “the human 
dimension […] represents the key aspect of the reform of Turkmen society and of its foreign 
policy course, which is identified in human values, humanitarian ideals, and universal justice: the 
basis of the policy of Neutral Turkmenistan” (Neytralnyi Turkmenistan, 2004). The Declaration 
on International Commitments Assumed by Neutral Turkmenistan in the Area of Human Rights, 
approved by the Peoples Council in December 1995, emphasizes that Turkmenistan is “aware of 
the responsibility to safeguard and protect the basic human rights and freedoms coming out of 
the country’s acceptance as permanently neutral” (Anceschi, 2009, p. 126). 
The content of Turkmenistan’s UN speeches has shown remarkable similarities over the years. 
On 12 December 2015, in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the UN’s recognition of positive 
neutrality, President Berdimuhamedow acknowledged the regime’s adherence to the 
humanitarian values, claiming that “Over the past twenty years, the neutral, peace-loving foreign 
policy of Turkmenistan has demonstrated compliance with national interests as well as long-term 
goals of the world community, the criteria of a constructive and balanced approach to building 
international stability and securing and establishing the principles of the UN Charter as the 
foundation of bilateral relations” (Neytralnyi Turkmenistan, 2015).  
While rhetorically committing to the UN Charter, the Turkmen regime aimed at introducing  
Aşgabat as an international center for peace talks (Shikhmuradov and Kepbanov, 199, pp. 67). In 
fact, the media in Turkmenistan has always exaggerated the role of President Niyazow  as a 
‘great mediator’ during the 1992 – 1997 Tajik Civil War, as if positive neutrality has contributed 
to the peace-building process in Tajikistan. By spreading this regime, Turkmenistan accepted 
10,000 Tajik refugees between 1992 and 1997, granting them full citizenship (UNHCR, 2005).  
President Berdimuhamedow has adhered to this strategy, appealing repeatedly to peace talks 
between the Taliban and the Afghan government held in Turkmenistan, as he mentioned it in his 
speech at the 65th session of the UN General Assembly in 2010 (Neytralnyi Turkmenistan, 
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2010). However, his main achievement if this context was undoubtedly hosting the UN’s 
Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia. 
In order to further adapt its positive neutrality to the democratic principles of the West, 
Turkmenistan has signed a range of international conventions on human rights since gaining 
independence:  the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1993, the Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1994, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in 1997, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1999, the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities in 2008 (Bradley, 2015). 
However, in practice the instruments of the human rights protection have not been implemented. 
The international community began to express its concern about the actual state of affairs in the 
human rights sphere in Turkmenistan, as the results of reports from Turkmenistan to various 
treaties were rather controversial. For example, the report from Turkmenistan to the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which operates under the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, submitted in 2004, noted that “The status of permanent neutrality […], and 
Turkmenistan’s international commitments associated with this status, have been influential in 
securing equality between citizens and compliance with international demands to ban all forms 
of discrimination” (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The committee, of course, saw its flaws, in 
particular the lack of information with regard to the ethnic composition. That report was heavily 
criticized, and almost all its content received negative comments from the committee. Under 
President Berdimuhamedow there is an example of report to the Committee against Torture in 
2011, where the description of the humanitarian values of positive neutrality is rather blurred 
(Bradley, 2015).  
It can be argued in this context that the regime in Turkmenistan uses its neutral status to shut the 
country away from the international civil society. President Berdimuhamedow continued the 
strategy of President Niyazov of non-cooperation, in particular denying access to the UN special 
procedures. In 2008 the visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion was the first 
UN special rapporteur visit in Turkmenistan, which would allow the UN to further insist on its 
reviews in the country. However, by 2010 there have been no further proceedings on that matter. 
Moreover, in 2008 Turkmenistan rejected any recommendations from the Universal Periodic 
Review before the UN Human Rights Council with regard to the political prisoners, claiming 
that all these persons were ordinary criminals (Human Rights Watch; 2011).  
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In 2012 the UN Universal Periodic Review exercised its review once again in Turkmenistan. 
Although most of the recommendations were accepted, the most pressing issues, such as the 
demands to release political prisoners or identify prisoners, disappeared in the country’s prison 
system, were unfortunately rejected (Human Rights Watch; 2013).  
The political discourse of the regime in Turkmenistan includes the principle of the guardian 
human rights as one of the most important. Neutrality, in this context, is used as a symbol of 
commitment to the values of the UN. The Turkmen regime tries to prove its legitimacy and 
adherence to democratic principles by signing major international conventions, despite numerous 
human rights violations in the country. Nevertheless, President Berdimuhamedow allows more 
space for the UN rather than his predecessor, as more reports have been submitted and more 
reviewers have visited Turkmenistan.   
In addition, the country has developed various aid programmes to African countries. In 2017 
Ashgabat hosted the Indoor and Marital Arts Asian games, which proved Turkmenistan to be 
capable of organising major international events (Horák, 2016). Although these efforts have 
perceived little resonance, still they gradually improve the country’s international image.  
Turkmenistan under President Berdimuhamedow becomes more visible on the international 
arena, preserving, at the same time, its permanently neutral status (Yapici, 2018, p. 437).  
It can be assumed that the strategy of positive neutrality in Turkmenistan can be explained by the 
regime survival approach. In order to avoid absorption of the country by great powers, the 
Turkmen regime adopted a permanently neutral strategy. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that the domestic-level explanation contributes to explaining 
the different forms of neutrality adopted by Turkmenistan and Ukraine. Whereas in the Turkmen 
case the more stable regime reflects in higher degree of institutionalization of neutrality, due to 
the extent of president’s authority, the case of Ukraine presents lower degree of regime 
consolidation, continuing to be in transition, thus, consequently, reflecting less institutionalized 
neutrality. 
 
3.3 Ideational explanation of permanent neutrality in Turkmenistan 
In the process of nation building, certain ideas and symbols are intentionally emphasized and 
presented as items of national importance. (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, p. 130)Such 
invention of new national ideals and traditions is a distinctive feature to all Central Asian 
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countries, which gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to distance 
themselves from the Soviet past, these new independent states put in place new national symbols 
and traditions that are still relevant. Turkmenistan followed this strategy of ‘cultural 
objectification’ as well (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, 131). Nationalist discourses in 
Turkmenistan highlighted the importance of pre-Soviet symbols, while rejecting or completely 
removing the influence of the ‘Russo-centric historiography’ (Kurzman 1999, p. 83) That is why 
the first President of independent Turkmenistan Saparmurat Nyyazow, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other state institutions strengthened the importance of neutrality in Turkmenistan 
after gaining independence in 1991, claiming that only such course “combines complete 
awareness of [Turkmenistan’s] place in the international political arena with the traditional 
attitude of Turkmens to the outer world’ (Shikhmuradov and Nurklychev 1996, p. 68). As 
neutrality was proclaimed to be the core idea of the Turkmen nation, the policy course in this 
regard was aimed at establishing the fixed status of permanent neutrality, and not ad-hoc or de-
facto version on neutrality in Sweden or Finland (Aneschi, 2010). 
Within the Turkmen domestic political discourse the term ‘permanent neutrality’ has got new 
meaning and application that differ from its legal definition. Instead of ‘permanent’, more often 
than not the neutrality in Turkmenistan is presented as ‘positive’ by officials, applying the same 
meaning as ‘perrmanent’. Such usage of the term has led to the blurring of the lines between the 
‘permanent’ and ‘positive’ versions of neutrality in Turkmenistan (Yapici, 2018). However, it 
should be noted that positive neutrality has no legal definition within international law, unlike 
permanent neutrality. In this context, positive neutrality defines a political discourse in 
Turkmenistan.   
Moreover, positive neutrality is described in Turkmenistan as a purely Turkmen concept that 
determines “the outcome of the entire course of development of the Turkmen nation” (Anceschi, 
2009, p. 55). President Nyyazow singled out the model of Turkmen neutrality from the history of 
European neutrals such as Austria or Switzerland, claiming that the Turkmen people had always 
followed a neutral mode of behaviour (Bradley, 2015). According to the researches of the State 
Institute of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Turkmenistan, Central Asia, and the Orient in 
Aşgabat, neutrality represents a true dream of the Turkmen people since the Seljuk reign over 
Central Asia in the 10th century (Kiepenheur-Drechsler, 2006, p. 133).  That is why the current 
policy of neutrality is seen as the logical continuation of a ‘national tradition’: “Speaking of 
historical conditionality of neutral model choice we shall state: neutrality, its main 
characteristics—peaceableness, tolerance, respect to foreign views and opinions, openness to the 
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world—correspond to the national thinking and peculiarities of historical development of the 
Turkmen nation” (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, p. 136). 
In addition, the former Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov notes that the policy of neutrality 
is “a modern re-elaboration of the traditional interactions between the Turkmen tribes and the 
outside world” (Anceschi, 2009, p. 49). He adds that the history of the Turkmen people, who 
preserved their national identity and territorial integrity for hundreds of years after the collapse 
of the great empires founded by the Turkmens, proves that the course on neutrality is the most 
successful foreign policy course for the Turkmen state. He says that “the traditions of 
peacefulness and good neighbourliness, the mentality and cultural originality of our people were 
also appropriate for this”. Moreover, Shikhmuradov describes neutrality in Turkmenistan as 
‘constructive neutrality’ that has no analogies or precedents in history. He explains then that such 
concept “combines the prospects for Turkmenistan’s own development with the trends and 
character of regional and global processes, and national interests with the objective requirements 
of today; it corresponds to the geographical, historical, and ethno-cultural realities of 
Turkmenistan, the mentality of its people, and their psychological disposition for good 
neighbourhood relations, mutual respect and tolerance” (Shikhmuradov, 1995). 
The UN General Assembly ratified the status of Neutral Turkmenistan on 12 December 1995. 
Turkmenistan was the first state to get this status from the UN and this fact is actively 
emphasized in the Turkmen ideology as the main achievement of Turkmenbashy’s foreign policy 
(Horak, 2005, p. 8). President Nyyazow noted that Turkmenistan’s neutral status demonstrated 
the respect of the world towards Turkmen, and Turkmenistan answers with a proper response: 
“Today we have once again re-interpreted the historical relationships of our nation with other 
countries. Their nations did not know Turkmens, but today they know about their peaceful 
character. It is not just coincidence that our Neutrality was welcomed firstly by our neighbours 
and then by the rest of the world” (Horak, 2005, p. 9)   
After the adoption of the UN resolution on the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan a new 
legislation had to be introduced in order to integrate Turkmenistan’s new official status into the 
state apparatus. The appropriate amendments to the Constitution were adopted by the People's 
Council on 27 December 1995. The Council then approved the decision to adopt the 
Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan 'About the Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan', a 
declaration of international obligations of neutral Turkmenistan in the area of human rights, and 
the concept of the foreign policy of Turkmenistan as a neutral state. These documents became 
the basis for constitutional and legal protection of the neutral status of Turkmenistan.  
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In Turkmenistan it is believed that the Turkmen model of neutrality is not based on the right for 
war, unlike European neutral examples. Neutrality in Turkmenistan is considered to be a model 
of co-operation and progress for peace in the region, because it is based on modern international 
law, which is ‘a law of peace’. The former Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov explains: “The 
proposed formula of stabilisation is vital for any society where human beings are declared to be 
of the highest value. For each individual, it means family and personal security, peace among 
friends, and peaceful labour. For the family it means peace in every house, a peaceful life and a 
succession of generations, the continuation of fathers' work and respect for parents. For social 
strata and population groups it is mutual social understanding and support, absence of conflicts 
and of tension. For nations it means inner- and inter-ethnic consent and mutual understanding” 
(Shikhmuradov, 1995). 
The Turkmenistan’s internal and external policy is influenced and determined by the three main 
pillars of the Turkmen national ideology: Independence, Permanent Neutrality and Ruhnama. 
(Horak, 2005, p. 7)According to the national ideology, there are several phases of development 
in the Turkmen history, where great leaders rule the Turkmen state at each phase. The beginning 
of the national revival is described as a ‘Golden Century’ under the leadership of one of the 
greatest leaders, Oguz Han. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkmen state undergoes a 
transition from one Golden Century under the leadership of Oguz Han to another Golden 
Century, which began under the leadership of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi or Leader of Turkmen 
Nation, i.e. President Saparmurat Nyyazow (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, p. 135).  
Turkmenistan’s National Revival Movement was an official program for building a new state, 
with a Turkmen identity and Muslim culture combined. It began at the fifth assembly of the 
People’s Council on 17 January 1994. The People’s Council was the highest representative body 
in Turkmenistan until 2008. The national revival included re-establishing Islam in the country 
after the Soviet times of atheism, restoring the Turkmen national customs, replacing the 
Communist Party with Democratic one. The aim of the national revival was to promote a new 
Independent Neutral Turkmenistan that constituted the Turkmen nation’s unique cultural identity 
and, at the same time, presented an international position (Kiepenheuer-Drechsler, 2006).  
President Nyýazow felt its obligation to guide his people at the new stage of state’s development 
and national revival, and he decided to write a guidebook. That book looked like a political 
pamphlet, similar to the intensions of Kadhdhafi’s The Green Book, Hitler’s Mein Kampf or 
Khomeini’s Velayat-e Faqih. He noted that “Ruhnama brings the national perception into a 
system and organisation. I have written the Ruhnama to enable my nation to perceive our past 
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and to envision our own dignity.” (Clement, 2014, p. 555). In Ruhnama Nyýazow presented his 
interpretation of Turkmen history, mixed up with his autobiography and family history, legends 
about Turkmen ancestors and their important deeds, and a moral code, comprised of Turkmen 
and Islamic values. As a whole, this book is considered to be a source of living, spiritual and 
moral guidelines for Turkmen people. However, unlike Mein Kampf and Velayat-e Faqih that 
promote external expansion, Ruhnama sounds similar to the Green Book, which is meant to be 
applied within one country or one people. In reality, Ruhnama is a book, filled with a number of 
diverse facts, inspired by the Koran, Turkmen traditions and customs, Turkmen interpretation of 
history and even communist brochures. According to Ruhnama, a combination of the three 
principles, i.e. Independence, Neutrality and Ruhnama, will lead to the main goal of President 
Turkmenbashy’s rule - the Golden Century. These principles represent all important ideals and 
values to Turkmens that will help them to recover after a long period of Russian repression 
(Horak, 2005, p. 9-10). 
Although President Nyýazow claimed most of the time that Ruhnama was ‘not a history book’, 
however its pages contained the great ‘lessons of history’(Nyýazow2002: 44, 74), and President 
persistently highlighted his expertise in Turkmen history. Nyýazow intended to teach his people 
how to be a ‘true’ Turkmen: moderately Muslim, Turkmen speaking and faithful to the state 
(Clement, 2014, p. 556). However, with some postulates of Ruhnama President Nyyazow 
expanded Turkmenification beyond what even ethnic Turkmen-speakers found tolerable. Popular 
tolerance for Nyýazow’s discourse began to decline, as it actively interfered in people’s lives. 
For example, President Nyýazow announced in August 2002 that the country would have to use 
a new calendar. The names of the months and the days of the week were changed by his 
presidential decree. The names of the months included the names of national heroes like Oguz 
Han and Alp Arslan, important events of the new Turkmen history such as the independence day, 
the declaration of permanent neutrality and the first publication of Ruhnama (Kiepenheuer-
Dreschsler, 2006, p. 134). The introduction of a new calendar signified the beginning of a new 
golden century in Turkmenistan’s history and fixed a complete break with the Soviet past. 
By means of propaganda tools, the symbolic representation of neutrality within the nationalist 
ideology has been actively promoted in many spheres. In Turkmenistan’s case it is worth 
mentioning the role of architecture in establishing new ideology. Ashgabat as a capital represent 
a real textbook of Turkmen ideology with its grandiose constructions. One of the main centres of 
such ‘ideological architecture’ is the Arch of Neutrality, the symbol of the Permanent Turkmen 
Neutrality. It was built in 1998 in the centre of the capital. The Arch of Neutrality was designed 
to show the beginning of a new era as independent and neutral Turkmenistan after the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union. The leader of this new ‘golden century’—President Saparmurat Turkmenbashy 
Niyazov—is represented in a golden statue on top of the building, with open arms above the 
capital (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, p. 133). 
The case of Turkmenistan exemplify quite illustratively how the foreign policy course can be 
actively used and promoted within nationalist and ideological discourses. Especially during the 
President Niyazov era, the concept of positive neutrality was deeply embedded into the life of 
the ordinary Turkmen citizens.  For example, the two olive branches in the national flag 
(Peyrouse 2007, p. 77), a central square and a main avenue, a major national holiday (12 
December, Neutrality Day), the official daily newspaper and even a month in the calendar 
introduced by the Niyazov regime in 2002 and abolished by Berdymukhammedov in April 2008 
– have been named after or inspired by the country’s neutral foreign policy (Aneschi, 2010). The 
official documents on the proclamation of neutrality are stored in the National Museum and are 
included in almost every publication on Turkmenistan (Kiepenheuer-Dreschsler, 2006, p. 132). 
Regarding the official daily newspaper, Neytralnyj Turkmenistan or Neutral Turkmenistan is the 
only Russian language paper published in the country. The renaming of the Soviet era 
Turkmenskaya Iskra to Neutral Turkmenistan took place on December 14, 1995, only two days 
after UN recognition. In addition, it was important to include a neutral foreign policy on the  
agenda of the researches at the institutions of higher learning throughout the country, and, more 
importantly, to attract younger generations to that idea. All history textbooks, for example, 
opened with such words: “Dear students, you can be children of different nations; Turkmen, 
Uzbek, Russian, Kazakh, Armenian, Byelorussian, and Azeri; but you are all the young citizens 
of independent and neutral Turkmenistan. Independent and neutral Turkmenistan is your 
country” (Denison, 2009, p. 178). Moreover, television and radio broadcasts had to pronounce 
such phrase: “The first country, which was accepted as permanently neutral by the UN, is our 
fatherland Turkmenistan. All Turkmens have the right to be proud of their fatherland. Therefore, 
it is compulsory for all of us to serve our fatherland” (Polese and Horak, 2015, p. 469).  
The celebration of Neutrality Day each year on 12 December is a huge event for all citizens of 
Turkmenistan. Anthony D. Smith notes in this context that national ceremonies are one of the 
most “potent and durable aspects of nationalism” (Bradley, 2015). Turkmenistan’s Neutrality 
Day is no exception. The year 2015 was announced as ‘The Year of Neutrality and Peace’ in 
honor of the 20th anniversary of the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1995, with over 400 
official parades across the country (RFE/RL; December 12, 2015). The President 
Berdymukhammedov delivered a televised national speech, emphasizing that “Neutrality is the 
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culmination of Turkmen democracy and will continue to guide our peaceful relations with the 
international community. More importantly, Positive Neutrality is the embodiment of our 
cooperative relationship with the UN and our continued support for the spread of peace and 
democracy to the outside world” (Bradley, 2015).  
The implementation of the policy of permanent neutrality in Turkmenistan is seen as an 
expression of the true Turkmen national idea. From the beginning of independence, any other 
foreign policy courses were rejected, while building multilateral relations in different directions. 
Neutrality has become more than a political guideline that enables Turkmenistan not to be 
obliged to other states, but it has become a moral guideline for society as well. Turkmenistan 
case proves that neutrality can be adopted as a national idea, which contributes to the 
development of the permanent neutral foreign policy course of a certain state. 
 
3.4 Ideational explanation of ad-hoc neutrality in Ukraine 
The idea of neutrality is often presented in Ukraine as a possible national idea, which is capable 
of uniting society. Indeed, declarations of neutral status may receive greater support than other 
possible alternatives - uncertain multivector foreign policy course or joining NATO and the EU. 
The issue in this context is whether such prospect of neutral Ukraine is real. 
The course on neutrality today is perceived by most Ukrainian experts as unlikely. There is no 
official document that would fix a neutral status of Ukraine. Although some officials claim that 
Ukraine has the legal grounds for the establishing a permanent neutrality in the Declaration of 
State Sovereignty, this argument should not be seen as an opportunity to implement permanent 
neutrality or even non-aligned status, since both statuses are not adopted in the 1996Constitution 
of Ukraine, which mentions only one of the signs of neutral status - not to place foreign military 
bases on its territory (Art. 17), although the final provisions of Art. 14 allows the use of existing 
military bases for the temporary stay of foreign military forces (Zlenko, 2008). 
The first mention of the permanent neutrality of Ukraine can be found in the above mentioned 
Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, approved by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian 
SSR (No. 55-XII of 16.07.1990). It states Ukraine's intention to become a permanently neutral 
state that does not participate in military blocs and adhered to three non-nuclear principles: not to 
possess, produce and acquire nuclear weapons. The Law of Ukraine on Defense of December 6, 
1991 also states that the country seeks neutrality and adheres to the three non-nuclear principles 
(Pavlenko 2009). 
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The neutral status of Ukraine was seen as temporary and declarative, necessary for a certain 
historical period, which was conditioned, firstly, by the uncertainty of the domestic political 
situation in Ukraine, and secondly, the uncertainty of the military-political situation in Europe. 
The government of newly independent Ukraine didn’t known what would happen to NATO as a 
result of the disappearance of the bipolar system. At that time there were no clear contours of the 
European security system. There was no certainty of Russian behaviour and the CIS as well. 
During the process of identifying the main vectors of the development at the international arena, 
the signs of intent to acquire a neutral or non-aligned status in Ukraine have been lost. In 1993 
the Military Doctrine of Ukraine mentioned non-aligned status as one of the basic principles of 
security assurance, however in the Military Doctrine adopted in 2004 this status disappeared. 
Instead, the Doctrine confirmed the principle of collective defense, which could be realized by 
means of full membership in NATO (Losev, 2008) 
The 1991referendum showed stunning majority - 90.3% in support of the Declaration of 
Independence, adopted by the Parliament August 24, 1991. Even in the Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions 83% of those who took part in the vote, said "yes" to an independent state, and in 
Crimea, despite the lowest turnout in the country, 54% of the votes were pro-Ukrainian. 
Moreover, 55% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine voted for Ukraine's independence. (It should 
be noted that the question of the referendum asked whether a voter supported the Act of 
Declaration of Independent Ukraine, but not Independent and Neutral Ukraine. This fact means 
that the role of neutrality in the Ukrainian nation-building process was minor. In addition, unlike 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, after gaining independence post-Soviet Ukraine 
managed to avoid separatist movements and territorial conflicts with its neighbours (Barash, 
2002). Nevertheless, more than twenty years later, when the pro-Russian "referendum" organized 
by separatists resulted in Russia's annexation of Crimea and Donbas armed conflict, it is 
reasonable to raise a question of why Ukrainian identity could not take roots in some parts of the 
country. 
Unlike Ukraine, European nations have centuries of experience in statehood, and there is no 
question for an individual of a national identity or the status of a national language as an 
expression of identity in their own state. In the European national states the daily accustoming to 
national identity and, in particular, to the language as a national identifier raises the issue of 
language to the level of individual consciousness or within the limits of personal identity. 
However, in Ukraine the question of language as the fundamental ethno-cultural component of 
identification becomes a matter of state security. 
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Formation of the Ukrainian nation and, accordingly, Ukrainian identity took place during a rather 
long historical period. It is argued that at the earliest stages of development, the Ukrainian 
identity acquired characteristics of European identity. In fact, Ukrainian identity began its 
formation since the time when the Ukrainian lands entered the Grand Duchy of Lithuaniawith 
the Ukrainian-Belarusian official language used from 1362 till 1569. Gradually, the Ruthenian 
(Ukrainian) elite, or gentry, was created with Ruthenian (Ukrainian) self-consciousness, and then 
later the concept of ‘Ukraine’ came into being (Gorbulin, 2008). This concept spreaded with the 
formation and strengthening of the Ukrainian Cossack military structure “Viys’ko Zaporoz’ke”. 
The norms of the public life of both the Lithuanian and Ukrainian lands expressed the rights and 
freedoms of the written law, which were regulated by the Lithuanian statutes - the First 1529, the 
Second 1566, the Third 1588, where each statute replaced the previous, as well as collections of 
‘German city rights’, like Magdeburg, the use of which was considered to be traditional in 
Ukraine. Thus, the lifestyle of Ukrainians, developed in the 16th-17th centuries, was quite 
European, which was expressed, firstly, with regard to the law as the supreme transcendental 
value; secondly - in the belief of the priority of individual being over the public; thirdly, in a 
combination of the moral and political-legal aspects of justice; fourthly, in the organization of 
economic and administrative lifestyles on the basis of self-government; fifthly, in defining 
freedom as the determining feature of personality (Gorbulin, 2008). 
Ukrainian ethnic identity in a mature form appeared in the first half of the XIX century. A new 
generation of spiritual and cultural elites, i.e. the speakers of Ukrainian romanticism, devoted 
themselves to the formation of an ethnic nation. Instead of the ‘Malorossiya’ definition, the term 
‘Ukraine’ was used to describe appropriate territories. From the time of romanticism in Ukraine, 
the ethnic concept of a nation has been updated, which is based on the following elements: 
common origin, mobilization of the people, native language, customs and traditions (Zlenko, 
2009). According to these principles, the nation means cultural and political ties that unite a 
single political community of all with a common historical culture and homeland. Moreover, it 
means that the socio-cultural identity of the individual lies in his entrenchment to the history of 
his people, culture, language, and traditions. At the same time, there was no mentioning of 
adherence to the principle of neutrality, as Ukrainian lands used to ‘belonging to someone else’. 
So the primary goal of the early nation-builders was simply to gain independence. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, nation-building in Ukraine has faced a number of 
political, demographic and cultural challenges. Unlike the Baltic states, the anti-communist 
opposition in Ukraine in the early 1990's was too weak to establish political and ideological 
hegemony. As Zlenko  noted, the political regime in Ukraine was the result of a compromise 
48 
 
between the national-democrats, which came from a broad opposition movement seeking 
national liberation, i.e. the Narodny Rukh (People's Movement), and so-called ‘sovereign 
communists’ - an opportunist group formed by members of the local communist nomenclature, 
who supported the reforms of Gorbachev (Zlenko, 2008). In the end, to a large extent the 
ideologically indifferent former communist nomenklatura adopted Ukrainian historical symbols, 
thus becoming a ‘party of power’ and the state builders. The yellow-blue flag, trident or tryzub 
as a national emblem and anthem, borrowed from a song of the times of struggle for national 
liberation at the beginning of the XX century, became official symbols of post-Soviet Ukraine, 
despite the resistance of orthodox communists.  
Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Ukrainian identity was not dismantled. The Pantheon of Soviet 
Ukrainian heroes did not become the subject of radical revision. Rather, it slowly expanded, 
including such state-builders of the past as the first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic, 
Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, whose images were placed on the national 
currency of Ukraine, the hryvnia, along with traditional canonical figures such as the poets Taras 
Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka (Makar, 2008). When the issues of the Holodomor of 1932-33, 
and the Stalinist repressions entered into a public discussion, the de-Sovietization was not 
completed, and the monuments of Lenin until recently remained untouched in most of the 
country. 
In the 1990's, Ukrainian nationalism could not boast with the vast support across the country. 
The democratic nationalism of the People's Movement and the radical nationalism were both 
quite popular in the western regions and among the Ukrainian elite in Kyiv, but they were not 
liked by the rest of the population. It also resulted in different views on possible external ally in 
the first years of independence, while the voice of maintaining neutrality was completely silent. 
In addition, unlike Estonia and Lithuania, in Ukraine citizenship was automatically granted to all 
permanent residents of the republic (Pashkov, 2000). This inclusive concept of citizenship has 
created the foundations for a civil Ukrainian nation. 
Since ethnic and linguistic boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians were blurred, the 
nationalization process in Ukraine was primarily aimed at giving a new look to cultural practices, 
and identities, thus essentially redefining and expanding the ‘core of the nation’. Most Russians 
and Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine could conveniently combine political loyalty to the 
new Ukrainian state with their Russian, Slavic, Orthodox or even Soviet cultural preferences. 
The division of national identity was strengthened by the Russian-language media, which 
dominated the Ukrainian market (Korolyov, 2012). Ukrainian language was proclaimed to be the 
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only state language in 1990 before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the first Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kravchuk, who came from the Ukrainian-speaking region, made serious efforts 
to preserve Ukrainian language. Leonid Kuchma, the second Ukrainian president, was elected in 
1994, mainly due to the support of the Russian-speaking eastern regions, although he did not 
then fulfil his pre-election promise - to grant Russian language a second official language status. 
The policy of President Viktor Yushchenko's identity was to legitimize the pro-Western 
geopolitical choice of Ukraine and put an end to post-Soviet uncertainty (Korolyov, 2012). 
Yushchenko saw Ukraine as a post-colonial nation, struggling for liberation from Russian 
political and cultural influences. He tried to rehabilitate Ukrainian nationalism, which for a long 
time was viewed through hostile Russian and Soviet lenses. Among his most prominent 
initiatives in the area of identity and memory policy was the founding of the Museum of Soviet 
Occupation, the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor and the official 
recognition of the genocide of the Ukrainian people, as well as the post-mortem award of “Hero 
of Ukraine” to Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera, leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army or UPA 1942-1954. President Yushchenko tried to institutionalize the policy of memory 
by creating the Institute of National Remembrance and assigning additional responsibilities to 
the SBU, such as controlling the archives, conducting historical research and popularizing a new 
official approach to the Soviet past (Vidnyansʹkyy, 2011). 
However, critical work with the Soviet past was inadequate due to weak democratic institutions, 
the lack of legal norms, as well as the political manipulation of historical memory by other 
parties. Yushchenko's uncritical attitude toward radical nationalism pushed back a significant 
part of the Ukrainian public that disagreed with the UPA's heroization and aggravated 
antagonism with Russia, which did not agree to recognize the Holodomor as a genocide. 
With the election of Yanukovych as a president in 2010, the Party of Regions failed to develop a 
consistent policy of identity at the national level, since it had little to offer to central and western 
Ukraine. Instead, that party continued to appeal to its main electorate in the eastern regions, 
cultivating the so-called ‘negative identity’, where the regional identity of the Donbas was 
determined by the rejection of ‘others’ - the nationalists of the western Ukraine (Vidnyansʹkyy, 
2011). The scheduled signing of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, 
scheduled for the end of 2013, could have temporarily reconciled Western Ukraine with 
Yanukovych. 
The EuroMaydan, which began in November 2013 as a protest against the government's decision 
to postpone the signing of the above-mentioned agreement, broke into massive protests against a 
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corrupt and brutal political regime and raised the old phobia of radical Ukrainian nationalism in 
the east and south. The pro-government media in Ukraine and the Russian mass media presented 
mass protests as an explosion of radical nationalism, and later as a ‘fascist putsch’. This rhetoric 
fell to a suitable soil, namely the old clichés and stereotypes that the Party of Regions and their 
ideological allies, Communists, cultivated over the years in response to the 2004 Orange 
Revolution. In the end, during the two post-Soviet decades, internal political constraints, the 
ideological polarization of the post-Soviet Ukrainian elites and strong incentives for the political 
use of historical memory and linguistic issues in electoral politics prevented the emergence of a 
strong national identity in Ukraine. 
During the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine plunged into the turbulence of historical acceleration. 
What began to happen in Ukraine contradicted the perceptions of Ukrainians about themselves. 
At the same time, on EuroMaidan and then in the struggle with the Russian aggressor, the 
national identity was awakened and established. Threats and victories began to reproduce 
national instincts, for a long time oppressed by the external interference and lack of coherence. 
The Ukrainian identity, which suffered a powerful blow because of collectivization and 
genocide, began to actively revive. Russian armed aggression only accelerated the process of 
rehabilitating of the Ukrainian national identity. 
The tragic events of 2014-2015 have shown an important feature of the Ukrainian national 
identity. Ukrainians used to view their history mostly with complaining about poor destiny and 
negative events. However, the Revolution of Dignity signified the presence of spontaneous 
democratic creativity of the people, people's will and protection. It contributed to the renewal of 
the torn string of the Ukrainian nation-building history, the restoration of those national 
traditions that are able to overcome the extremely difficult legacy of the recent totalitarian past 
and to establish the democratic institutions, acceptable and suitable for functioning in a 
postmodern society.  
Identification processes of nowadays Ukraine have a nonlinear character, and it is not just a 
return to historical roots, but a complicated process of forming a modern, adequate Ukrainian 
realities of the XXI century as a necessary condition for self-preservation of the country. 
According to the Ukrainian philosopher S. Datsyuk, in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014-
2015 two fundamentally different identities collided. The first identity is a national or 
nationalistic Ukrainian identity. Its concept-making value is Ukrainian national statehood, as 
well as principled guidelines: the fundamental principle of the world's territory division into 
states is the national organization of the world; guarantees of the development of culture and the 
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language of the titular nation is a monopoly of the state; corporations should serve the interests 
of the nation, or at least not to enter into conflicts with these interests; only a nation can be the 
basis of civil society, through which it exercises control over the state and corporations; 
diasporas in the world can be united only on the basis of national culture and language (Datsyuk, 
2015). 
The second identity is imperial Russian identity. Its concept-making value is the creation of a 
‘great Russian Empire’. It follows from the principles: state must dominate the nations that are 
part of the empire, first of all - over the titular nation, i.e. the empire has a supranational 
territorial character; state retains a monopoly over the allocation of natural resources between 
corporations, as well as over the control of mass consciousness - in the name of the power of the 
empire. S. Datsyuk characterizes this type as an ‘empire of rent and control’; only the state-
controlled corporations can be large, others are not allowed; only state can give freedom to civil 
society to the extent that it considers necessary - again for the benefit of the empire; an empire 
has a ‘strong right’ to expand on the territory of neighbouring countries and aggression to the 
rest of the world (Datsyuk, 2015). 
The first and second identities are unitary, so they seek to dominate other identities. Unitary 
identity, by refusing to collide with another unitary identity, loses its essential basis - the 
opportunity to determine the binary opposite ‘other’. Therefore, the first and second identities are 
doomed to conflict with each other and with other unitary identities (Datsyuk, 2015). Of course, 
this theory was influenced by the Ukrainian nationalist propaganda, however, such theories have 
remained dominant within the domestic political discourse in Ukraine.  
Moreover, during the Revolution of Dignity, it can be argued that the third image of identity was 
formed – a European Ukrainian identity. In Ukraine, the problem of European integration once 
again appears as a question of national and cultural identity and manifests itself in the form of a 
crisis of identity, especially the problem of preserving the national one. In addition to democracy 
and human rights, economic and even social features can be applied as a solid foundation for 
European identity in Ukraine. Europeanization has become an actual practical task of Ukraine's 
domestic and foreign policy, which should be solved, according to official discourse, in the 
context of European integration of Ukraine, with a full-fledged membership in this supranational 
formation as an independent subject of international relations. At the same time, two opposing 
trends must be taken into account - Euro-optimistic and European-pessimistic. Consequently, the 
formation of the European identity of Ukrainian citizens is be the result of the influence of 
various factors, first of all - economic, political, cultural, and legitimacy of the European Union 
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as a political institution. Thus, the European Union has become an equally important political 
entity for Ukrainian citizens and Ukraine as a nation state. 
Obviously, as a result of these processes, the structure and hierarchy of identities of the 
Ukrainian society will change. It is likely that these processes will not be simple, since the 
formation of Ukrainian national identity and European supranational identity must be 
coordinated. It will be significantly different from the Soviet or imperial Russian identity above 
all with values, ideology and traditions. In this context, a new identity has to focus on what 
unites Ukraine with European nations - common Christian roots, European traditions pf 
governance, the history memory of Ukraine in various documents and monuments, economic 
and cultural ties. And this will require constant and consistent work in the political, economic, 
legal, educational and cultural spheres. After all, the process of Europeanization does not happen 
automatically. At the same time, the attachment to Ukrainian national identity and the emotional 
sense of belonging to Europe should be strengthened. 
In general, protests on the Maidan, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the military conflict 
in the Donbass united the pro-Ukrainian majority and at the same time further polarized the 
Ukrainian society. Moreover, the conflict in the Donbass is still far from its solution, and a new 
military escalation or even direct Russian invasion cannot be ruled out. This poses an additional 
challenge to the Ukrainian leadership, which in this situation is placed between patriotic 
mobilization of society and the need for reconciliation and ideological compromise, in order to 
prevent the further alienation of an ambitious majority in the east. President Poroshenko and the 
Ukrainian parliament may continue to pursue Viktor Yushchenko's historic memory policy 
aimed at rehabilitating and heroizing the UPA, or he may try to balance the antagonistic memory 
and identity after studying the lesson of the recent past. In his speech on the Independence Day 
in August 2014, President Poroshenko mentioned the heroic traditions of the UPA, but compared 
the struggle of the Ukrainian Donbass with the Great Patriotic War - at first glance, a paradoxical 
ideological combination (Press Service of the President, 2014). In October 2014, when President 
was asked about his position as to whether the UPA soldiers deserved recognition, Poroshenko 
replied that consideration should be given to granting veterans the legal status of combatants in 
the Second World War. Soon, on October 14, he announced the holiday of the Pokrova as a new 
state holiday - the Day of the Defenders of Ukraine, thus ending the Soviet tradition of 
celebrating the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland on February 23 (Press Service of the 
President, 2014). Since October 14 is also a symbolic day for the UPA's history, such decision 
provoked criticism from the ideological opponents of Ukrainian nationalism. 
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A month later, President Poroshenko made another important symbolic act, declaring November 
21 as the Day of Dignity and Freedom. He said that day: “Ukraine is a territory of dignity and 
freedom. We did not do this alone, but with two revolutions - our Maidan in 2004, which was the 
Liberty Day, and the 2013 Revolution of Dignity (Press Service of the President, 2014). The 
Liberty Day was originally introduced by President Yushchenko and should have been 
celebrated on November 22 in memory of the Orange Revolution, but this initiative was 
abolished by President Yanukovych. Thus, Poroshenko restored this tradition, putting it in a new 
meaning. The institutionalization of the narrative of the Revolution of Dignity meets the 
expectations of a patriotic public and refers to the civic concept of a new Ukrainian identity, 
which is defined through universal values. 
The search for the reconciliation of historical narratives is extremely necessary for Ukraine to 
achieve internal stabilization. However, the goal of reconciliation is unlikely to be compatible 
with the requirements of the Maidan - de-Sovietization, lustration of the state apparatus and 
punishment of officials responsible for the bloodshed in Kyiv in February 2014. Consensus, if at 
all possible, would have to prohibit the neo-Soviet ghost - in other words, the overthrown 
monuments to Lenin are unlikely to be restored, even in the east. In any case, even if a political 
solution to the conflict in the Donbass is found, ideological reconciliation of Kyiv with the 
current leadership of the Donetsk or Lugansk ‘republics’ accepting Russian nationalism and neo-
Stalinism is difficult to imagine. The three representations of identity – nationalist Ukrainian, 
imperialist Russian and European-Ukrainian- still exists and continue to spark debates among 
scholars and officials. However, the ideas on neutral identity in Ukraine are very weak, and 
scholars prefer to avoid this issue, as it provokes major criticism for promoting a pessimistic and 
failed position. As the idea of neutrality has not achieve massive support within Ukrainian 
national discourse, only ad-hoc attempts and the non-aligned status options have been applied 
throughout the history of independent Ukraine. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that the ideational explanation contributes to explaining the 
different forms of neutrality adopted by Turkmenistan and Ukraine. Whereas in the Turkmen 
case the idea neutrality is deeply embedded into the national identity, thus resulting in higher 
degree of institutionalization of neutrality, however, in Ukraine case, neutrality forms less part of 
national identity, and this reflects in less institutionalized neutrality. 
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Conclusion 
The central aim of this study has been to contribute to growing literature on neutrality in 
international relations by developing theoretical explanations of the different forms of neutrality 
states adopt, i.e. permanent neutrality, non-alignment. For this purpose, it reviewed the existing 
literature, and on this basis, it has developed the distinction between permanent and non-
permanent forms of neutrality (i.e. non-alignment), which differ in terms of the degree of 
institutionalization. Second, the thesis developed two explanations of why states adopt one or 
another forms of neutrality, a domestic-level and an account emphasizing ideational factors. 
Whereas geopolitical explanations do not account for the form of neutrality, domestic-level and 
ideational accounts can put forward an explanation under which conditions a particular form of 
neutrality is adopted. On this basis, the study put forward two hypotheses: the first hypothesis is 
based on a domestic level explanation of the alignment behaviour, and states the more 
consolidated a regime, the more permanent form of neutrality; the second hypothesis is derived 
from a constructivist approach of alignment behaviour, and states that the more the idea of 
neutrality forms part of national identity, the higher the degree of institutionalization of 
neutrality. The hypotheses have been consequently applied to the cases of Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan. 
This thesis has analyzed different factors, affecting the degree of non-alignment behaviour, in 
particular permanent neutral status and non-aligned status. The research question was: “What 
determines the choice of permanent neutrality in Turkmenistan and non-alignment in Ukraine?” 
While a geopolitical explanation has been rejected in this study, it concludes that both domestic-
level factors, such as regime consolidation, and ideational factors, such as the extent to which 
neutrality forms part of national identity, contribute to a state adopting different forms of 
neutrality to different degrees. Thus, the hypotheses, derived from domestic-level and ideational 
accounts of alignment, have been confirmed. This study, therefore, concludes that both 
explanations, domestic and ideational, contribute to adopting different forms of neutrality. 
While these findings have not yet distinguished a common single explanation of different forms 
of neutrality, the thesis has stated the reasonability of both explanations. In this context, it should 
be noticed that the aim of the thesis was to formulate theoretical explanations of forms of 
neutrality. Further studies should, therefore, try to establish the relative explanatory weight of 
those explanations. In addition, future studies could apply the explanations this study has 
suggested to other geographical context, and see whether the explanations still hold. 
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By exploring the concept of neutrality and its different forms, this thesis has contributed to the 
literature on neutrality in international relations by sharpening the conceptual distinction between 
forms of neutrality, which can be distinguished according to degree of institutionalization; it has 
made an attempt to define explanations of neutrality, thereby furthering the understanding of 
under which conditions states adopt one or another form of neutrality. Moreover, the thesis has 
explored two cases of two forms of neutrality – permanent neutrality and non-alignment – in 
Ukraine and Turkmenistan. In this way, it has also contributed to literature on alignment 
behaviour in post-Soviet region (Bradley, 2015; Horak, 2010; Vidnyans’kyy, 2011). This study 
has opened up various avenues for further research into the idea of neutrality in the 
contemporary context.  
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